The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Sporadic
violence against the MNF in MND(SE) continues, but at a much
lower
level than
in the Sunni areas: some 1 percent of all attacks in Iraq. There
has been
considerable
development of the ISF in the South, but they remain largely
untested.”
73.
On engagement
with Sunni Arabs, the JIC judged that:
“Winning
over Iraq’s Sunni Arab population is key to reducing the insurgency
over
time.
Outreach to them by the Shia-dominated Iraqi Transitional
Government has
been slow
and in some cases reluctant. International pressure has helped
create
some
momentum. But overall, outreach has been insufficient to reduce
Sunni Arab
concerns.
“Sunni
attitudes to the political process are mixed. Sunni Arab political
groupings
remain
fluid, and their politicians have not developed a common political
platform.
But there
is a general perception that the Shia and Kurds are reluctant to
share
political
power; that the national reconstruction effort is not benefitting
Sunni areas;
that some
of the Iraqi Security Forces are targeting Sunnis; and that
ministries are
being
purged of Sunnis under the guise of de-Ba’athification. While some
of these
claims have
a basis of fact, many are exaggerated. A timetable for MNF
withdrawal
also
features strongly among Sunni demands.
“The extent
to which Sunni concerns are taken into account in next
month’s
draft
Constitution (particularly about federalism and the need for them
to benefit
from
natural resources); whether it is approved in October’s referendum;
and
the outcome
of December’s elections will all be critical for establishing a
sense
of
enfranchisement for the Sunnis. Even on the most optimistic
scenario, their
expectations
will not be fully met. They have not become reconciled to
their
loss of
dominance.
“There are
links between some Sunni political figures and insurgent leaders,
but we
do not
believe the Sunni political parties can yet exert enough influence
to command
a reduction
in violence.”35
74.
The JIC
assessed that many Sunnis believed that the Shia coalition that led
the ITG
was an
Iranian stooge with an anti-Sunni agenda. At a local level, there
was anecdotal
evidence
and allegations to suggest that Sunnis were being forced out of
their homes
in
predominantly Shia areas and that some of the ISF (particularly
those controlled
by the Shia
Minister of the Interior) were responsible for inflaming sectarian
tensions
by
detaining and even killing Sunnis without justification. Although
those reports and
allegations
could not be verified, and the JIC assessed that many of the claims
that had
been made
were exaggerated, it judged that in Basra there was some
justification for the
feeling of
discrimination and that the perception was reinforcing sectarian
divisions.
35
JIC
Assessment, 14 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Outreach to Sunni
Arabs’.
502