10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
124.
Mr Benn
reported that he had spoken to UN Secretary-General Annan, and
thought
it unlikely
the UN would deploy more staff to Iraq before the elections (the UN
currently
had two
officers in Iraq, one supported by DFID).
125.
Mr Benn
said that he would be happy to help the MOD with funding for QIPs
if it
was better
able to implement projects than civilian experts.
126.
Cabinet
Office, DFID, FCO and MOD officials met on the same day to
consider,
at No.10’s
request, how to “push forward” PCO reconstruction
efforts.69
The
meeting
agreed that
the UK should:
•
increase
efforts to monitor PCO activity across Iraq, although with a focus
on
MND(SE);
and
•
make an
“open-ended” offer of support to the US for PCO programmes
across
Iraq (not
just in the South).
127.
By 29 October,
preliminary airstrikes against targets in the Fallujah
area
128.
Mr Quarrey
advised Mr Blair on 2 November that “planning for the
post-conflict
phase
remains inadequate, and the US now seem resigned to
this”.71
129.
A DFID
official based in Basra advised Mr Drummond on 3 November that
PCO
projects in
the South remained “almost invisible” to the general public, and
that Iraqi
engagement
in and influence on PCO operations appeared to be
minimal.72
130.
Mr Blair
met Prime Minister Allawi in Brussels on 5 November.
131.
In preparation
for the meeting, Mr Quarrey provided a list of “points that
Allawi
needs to
cover before he approves any military action” in
Fallujah.73
Those
included
“the follow-up
package of political and economic measures”.
The US said they had
funding
ready, but the IIG’s own preparations looked inadequate. Prime
Minister Allawi
had to take
responsibility for those preparations.
132.
At the
meeting, Mr Blair said that:
“… he
[Prime Minister Allawi] knew the military commanders were keen to
move
now. But it
was vital that we balanced the political and military priorities.
Unless
there was
an argument for an immediate move, then he believed we needed to
take
69
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Drummond, 28 October 2004,
‘Iraq: Monitoring and Accelerating
PCO
Disbursement’.
70
Minute
Dowse to Sheinwald, 29 October 2004, ‘Iraq Update – 29
October’.
71
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 2 November 2004,
‘Fallujah’.
72
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Drummond, 3 November 2004, ‘PCO’.
73
Minute
Quarrey to Blair, 4 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Breakfast with
Allawi’.
217