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3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –
the negotiation of resolution 1441
“It is impossible to say what difference this would have made but the text did change
after my meeting with the Prime Minister [on 22 October 2002] and my advice on it
was not sought. Some of those changes were in my view significant and featured in
my eventual advice.”366
995.  Lord Goldsmith added that it would not be “impossible for an Attorney General
in London to give advice throughout the process of negotiations”, but that would have
required him to have “been given much more information and to have been included
to a far greater extent”.367
996.  Asked whether Lord Goldsmith should have been more closely involved in the
negotiation of resolution 1441, Mr Blair stated:
“… in retrospect it would have been sensible to have had him absolutely in touch
with the negotiating machinery all the way through …”368
997.  Sir Michael Wood identified the “main consequence” of the fact that Lord Goldsmith
did not give advice at the later stages of the negotiation was that “there was inevitably
some uncertainty about his views on the meaning of the resolution, which made it
difficult for FCO Legal Advisers to advise Ministers”. But it was “far from clear that having
his further views during the negotiation would have made a significant difference to the
course of the negotiations or to the terms of the eventual resolution”.369
998.  Lord Goldsmith decided to convey his views orally rather than in writing
on a number of occasions, including in response to the three explicit requests,
of 24 September, 18 October and 4 November 2002, from FCO Legal Advisers
for his advice.
999.  Lord Goldsmith bears some responsibility for not seeking more assertively
to ensure that his views were known and understood by those negotiating the
resolution and those responsible for its implementation.
The role of FCO Legal Advisers in the negotiation of resolution 1441
1000.  Mr Wood and Mr Macleod did not have full visibility of the discussions
between Mr Blair and Mr Straw and their counterparts which led to some of the
key provisions in resolution 1441.
1001.  Nor did they see all the records of discussions in which Lord Goldsmith
set out his concerns.
1002.  The accounts given to the Inquiry by Sir Michael Wood, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock and Mr Macleod, about the UK Permanent Mission to the UN
366 Statement, 4 January 2011, paragraphs 1.5‑1.6.
367 Statement, 4 January 2011, paragraph 1.14.
368 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 53.
369 Statement, 15 March 2011, page 12.
375
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