The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

225. Mr Campbell wrote that he left it to Sir David and Mr Powell to decide what to do

with his minute, “but it might be worth sending round as a general message that if people

are talking loosely … they are being foolish and risk being highly counter‑productive”.

226. Mr Powell commented on the manuscript: “David [Manning] will speak to

the FCO.”77

227. Sir David Manning discussed the issue with Dr Rice on both 1 and 2 September.78

228. There is no record of the first conversation although it was a difficult one which

Sir David had reported orally to Mr Blair. He described the second conversation as

“much easier” and “a great deal better than it might have been”. Sir David said he had

told Dr Rice that Mr Blair was “angry at the way the British press were covering the Iraq

issue”, and that “We were doing all we could to ensure that there were no leaks at our

end.” Mr Blair “had given fierce instructions”. Sir David suggested that the coverage

“was probably the result of speculation, lucky hits, and people driving their own agenda”.

229. Sir David told Dr Rice that Mr Blair would deal with Iraq at his press conference the

following day. Mr Blair would “dismiss all suggestions” that he was “trying to pressure

the US”. There was “no lack of consultation” and Mr Blair would not “want to pressure

the President” because he “believed very strongly that Saddam must be dealt with”.

“However difficult, we had to face up to the problem and to the wider problem of WMD.”

Mr Blair and President Bush “might get together at some point if you both felt that was

useful”. Sir David reported that Dr Rice was content with that line.

230. Sir David Manning also reported that he and Dr Rice had discussed elements of a

“very tough” resolution, including a stipulation that the UN inspectors would have force

protection and the possibility of “external back up” provided by larger military forces in

a number of neighbouring countries who would invade Iraq if Saddam tried to obstruct

the work of UNMOVIC. The assumption was that the resolution should be tabled two or

three days after President Bush’s speech on 12 September. Sir David added: “With luck,

we may be over the worst. Your [Mr Blair’s] press conference tomorrow will obviously

be important.”

231. Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair was “livid” about the stories in the media and had

spoken to Mr Powell and Sir David Manning “saying that he wanted message round the

system that all this loose talk had to stop. And he wanted the Americans to know how

angry he was”.79

232. Mr Campbell also wrote that Dr Rice had “said it looked like we were trying to push

them, and they didn’t like it”. He added that Dr Rice liked the argument that the UN was

the route to deal with Iraq, not the route to avoid it.

77 Manuscript comment Powell on Minute Campbell to Manning, 2 September 2002, [untitled].

78 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 2 September 2002, ‘Conversation with Condi Rice’.

79 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown to

Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

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