12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
Training of
individual army recruits followed one of two patterns:
•
Recruits with
former military experience went into a Direct Recruit
Replacement
programme.
They received three weeks’ standardised training delivered by
the
Major Subordinate
Commands at Regional Training Centres.
•
Recruits
without military experience were sent for training at the Iraqi
Training
Brigade in
Kirkush. All new recruits undertook a five‑week programme
followed
by an
additional three to seven weeks of specialist skills
training.527
The
five‑week
programme was increased to 13 weeks in early 2007.528
In 2006, a
system of six Regional Training Centres was established to develop
a
non‑commissioned
officer corps and a year‑long Basic Officers Commissioning
Course,
based on a
Sandhurst curriculum, was established at three Military
Academies.529
By early
2007, a National Defence University had been established and was
beginning
to run
institutions of professional development: Iraqi Staff Colleges, a
National Defence
College and
a Strategic Studies Institute.530
In May
2007, the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, part of the Joint
Headquarters
assumed
responsibility from MNSTC‑I for training and equipping the Iraqi
military.531
584.
On 23
September, Lieutenant General John McColl, SBMR‑I, sent Lt
Gen Fry,
Deputy
Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments) from July 2003 to March
2006, a
paper on
the UK’s options for withdrawing or reducing the number of troops
in Iraq “up
to and
beyond January 2006” (see Section 9.3).532
He stated
that the IPS would have
manned,
trained and equipped “77 percent” of the target 135,000 officers by
the end of
July 2005
and the ING numbers were also “on course” to be achieved by that
date. Lt
Gen McColl
wrote that “these encouraging projections have, in part, prompted
MNF‑I’s
aspiration
to establish Iraqi regional … control across all 18 provinces by 31
July 2005”.
585.
Lt
Gen McColl considered the goal “challenging” because of
“significant shortfalls
in
logistics capability” of the ISF. He highlighted a lack of trained
staff, a “serious rift”
between the
MOI and IMOD and “the need for a proper national security
headquarters”.
527
Report to
Congress, 13 October 2005, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
528
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
529
Report to
Congress, 17 February 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
530
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
531
Report to
Congress, 14 September 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
532
Minute
McColl to DCDS(C), 23 September 2004, Iraq up to and Beyond January
2006 – Defining a UK
Position’.
183