The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
153.
Mr McKane
advised that the cost of military combat operations, including
“repairs,
replenishment
and reconfiguration”, could be between £2.5bn and
£3bn.
154.
Mr McKane
also provided the MOD’s “outline ‘first thoughts’ projection” of
the cost
of
maintaining a military presence in post‑conflict Iraq.
Mr McKane advised that the
MOD had not
yet been assigned “firm tasks” for the post‑conflict period and
that the
size and
type of forces required would depend on US plans. With that caveat,
the MOD
estimated
that UK forces might be required for 30 months at a cost of £2.3bn
(including
a six‑month
deployment of HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), but
excluding
UORs
related to military post‑conflict tasks).
155.
On 19
February, in advance of meetings with Mr John Snow, the US
Secretary of
the
Treasury, and other G7 finance Ministers, Mr Brown received a
number of papers
156.
A paper by
Mr Dodds and a junior Treasury official provided the
first
comprehensive
estimate of the cost of the UK’s intervention in Iraq (including
military
and
non‑military, conflict and post‑conflict costs).106
The advice
on non‑military costs
is described
later in this Section.
157.
The officials
advised that the Treasury’s best estimate of the cost of UK
military
combat
operations was now £3bn over the three financial years from
2002/03, with an
associated
£400m in RAB costs over the three financial years from 2003/04. The
MOD’s
estimate
remained lower: the Treasury doubted that the MOD had shared with
it the full
cost of
replacing and restocking armaments and equipment used in a
conflict.
158.
The officials
advised that the Treasury was “now starting to get some sense”
from
the MOD on
the cost of post‑conflict peacekeeping/stabilisation. While no
decision had
yet been
taken on whether to contribute UK forces after a
conflict:
“In
practice once we are on the ground, unless contributions from other
nations are
available
the political pressure to stay will be intense.”
159.
There were a
number of ways that an “occupation … force” might be
organised.
The
“biggest commitment, and hence the most expensive” would be if the
UK became
responsible
for a particular geographical sector. The Treasury’s estimate
reflected that
commitment.
160.
The MOD had
not yet provided firm estimates for how much such an
occupation
force
(including responsibility for a geographical sector) might cost.
Internal Treasury
work
suggested £500m in 2003/04 and £1bn in 2004/05 (in addition to the
cost of
military
combat operations).
105
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 19 February 2003, ‘Update
on Iraq’.
106
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 19 February 2003, ‘Update
on Iraq’ attaching Paper
Treasury,
19 February 2003, ‘Iraq Conflict – Public Expenditure
Impact’.
468