15.1 | Civilian
personnel
841.
Mr Giles
Lever, Head of the IPU, advised Mr Miliband that officials in
the FCO,
MOD, DFID,
Home Office and Cabinet Office had found it difficult to agree a
common
approach:
•
The FCO saw
a strong moral, reputational and operational case for doing
more
to assist
Iraqi staff facing security threats and those who had been forced
to
leave UK
government employment due to security. The FCO had
around
27 LE staff
in Baghdad and estimated no more than 100 current and
former
staff in
Basra would be eligible.
•
DFID, with
a very small number of LE staff, broadly shared the FCO
view.
•
The MOD had
directly employed around 15,000 Iraqi citizens since
2003,
and tens of
thousands more through international or local contractors. It
was
“nervous
about the resource implications for any commitment to do more
for
Iraqi
staff”. The MOD was also concerned that any promise of assistance
to
LE staff
(for example, asylum in the UK) would be “a catalyst for an
exodus
of staff”
and “would undermine MND (SE)’s ability to operate
effectively”.
•
The Home
Office was “predictably unwilling to contemplate any relaxation of
the
asylum/immigration
rules for Iraqis who have worked for HMG, especially in
view
of MOD’s
numbers”. It was also concerned that any change in policy “could
act
as a pull
factor for a large number of Iraqis”.541
842.
On 7 August,
the Cabinet Office advised Mr Brown that the numbers
involved
were large,
policy differed between the FCO/DFID and the MOD, and “our
current
immigration/asylum
policies mean that there are few straightforward
options”.542
The
two
principal
alternatives were resettlement and financial
assistance.
843.
Three options
were put forward for reducing the number of eligible staff to
more
manageable
levels:
•
Distinguishing
between LE staff directly employed by the UK and those hired
on
a casual
basis or via contractor. More than 15,000 Iraqi citizens would
still be
eligible,
but a large number hired through international or local contractors
would
be
excluded.
•
Establishing
a minimum level of service of perhaps 12 or 24 months.
Depending
on the
timeframe, about 330 or 230 Iraqi citizens would be
eligible.
•
Prioritising
interpreters and other white collar staff on the grounds
that
professional
staff were mission critical and more closely identifiable with the
UK.
Questions
of fairness could arise. Around 120 (12‑month minimum service)
or
100
(24‑month minimum service) were estimated to be
eligible.
844.
Mr Brown
asked the Cabinet Office to co‑ordinate a Whitehall‑wide
review,
reporting
to the Defence, Foreign and Home Secretaries.543
The review
should establish
541
Minute IPU
[junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 1 August 2007, ‘Iraq:
Locally Engaged Staff’.
542
Minute
Turner to Prime Minister, 7 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Locally Engaged
Staff’.
543
Letter
Turner to Carver, 8 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Locally Engaged
Staff’.
387