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15.1 | Civilian personnel
841.  Mr Giles Lever, Head of the IPU, advised Mr Miliband that officials in the FCO,
MOD, DFID, Home Office and Cabinet Office had found it difficult to agree a common
approach:
The FCO saw a strong moral, reputational and operational case for doing more
to assist Iraqi staff facing security threats and those who had been forced to
leave UK government employment due to security. The FCO had around
27 LE staff in Baghdad and estimated no more than 100 current and former
staff in Basra would be eligible.
DFID, with a very small number of LE staff, broadly shared the FCO view.
The MOD had directly employed around 15,000 Iraqi citizens since 2003,
and tens of thousands more through international or local contractors. It was
“nervous about the resource implications for any commitment to do more for
Iraqi staff”. The MOD was also concerned that any promise of assistance to
LE staff (for example, asylum in the UK) would be “a catalyst for an exodus
of staff” and “would undermine MND (SE)’s ability to operate effectively”.
The Home Office was “predictably unwilling to contemplate any relaxation of the
asylum/immigration rules for Iraqis who have worked for HMG, especially in view
of MOD’s numbers”. It was also concerned that any change in policy “could act
as a pull factor for a large number of Iraqis”.541
842.  On 7 August, the Cabinet Office advised Mr Brown that the numbers involved
were large, policy differed between the FCO/DFID and the MOD, and “our current
immigration/asylum policies mean that there are few straightforward options”.542 The two
principal alternatives were resettlement and financial assistance.
843.  Three options were put forward for reducing the number of eligible staff to more
manageable levels:
Distinguishing between LE staff directly employed by the UK and those hired on
a casual basis or via contractor. More than 15,000 Iraqi citizens would still be
eligible, but a large number hired through international or local contractors would
be excluded.
Establishing a minimum level of service of perhaps 12 or 24 months. Depending
on the timeframe, about 330 or 230 Iraqi citizens would be eligible.
Prioritising interpreters and other white collar staff on the grounds that
professional staff were mission critical and more closely identifiable with the UK.
Questions of fairness could arise. Around 120 (12‑month minimum service) or
100 (24‑month minimum service) were estimated to be eligible.
844.  Mr Brown asked the Cabinet Office to co‑ordinate a Whitehall‑wide review,
reporting to the Defence, Foreign and Home Secretaries.543 The review should establish
541  Minute IPU [junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 1 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Locally Engaged Staff’.
542  Minute Turner to Prime Minister, 7 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Locally Engaged Staff’.
543  Letter Turner to Carver, 8 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Locally Engaged Staff’.
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