9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
201.
But the cost
had been high:
“With 41 UK
deaths so far this year, my command has overseen just shy of
one
quarter of
the deaths incurred during the entirety of Op TELIC, including the
war-
fighting
phase. A further 400+ have been injured, of which about half will
not return
to
service.”
202.
Maj Gen Shaw
wrote that there continued to be uncertainty over whether the
Iraqi
Army 10th
Division or the Palace Protection Force (PPF) would take over
responsibility
for Basra
Palace when MND(SE) vacated it. Gen Petraeus favoured the PPF,
which
Maj Gen
Shaw considered to be “on track to being capable of taking over by
the end
of the
month”. Reports indicated that that OMS/JAM had no intent to attack
the Palace
once it
became Iraqi Government property.
203.
In his formal
end of tour report to Lt Gen Houghton, Maj Gen Shaw reflected on
the
possibilities
for and constraints on achieving strategic “success” in
Iraq:
“The issue
of ‘success’ has centred on the unspoken question: Iraqi success
or
coalition
(US/UK) success? The gap between the coalition’s goals for Iraq
and
where we
are now has been a constant source of tensions, not just with the
press
but in
judgements about risk …”93
204.
On resources,
Maj Gen Shaw reported:
“We have
been hamstrung for resources throughout the tour, driven by
the
rising
strategic significance of the Afghan deployment. The lack of clear
Main
Effort
between the two theatres made a perpetual struggle of the bidding
war for
resources.
This tour has reinforced my prior judgement that Iraq has more
strategic
significance
than Afghanistan although our projected posture in the South
is
increasingly
questionable.”
205.
Despite these
constraints, Maj Gen Shaw remained optimistic about the future
of
southern
Iraq, concluding:
“… Shia
unity makes violence in the South self-limiting; Iraqi nationalism
will triumph
over
Iranian influence; the parties and factions, attracted by financial
gain, will
reach an
accommodation in the South in a way that allows all to prosper from
a
functioning
entity.”
206.
On 16 August,
the Iraq Senior Officials Group was told by an MOD official
that
handover of
Basra Palace and the PJCC were both planned for 31 August, but a
delay
of a few
days was possible to ensure that the PPF was properly
equipped.94
93
Letter Shaw
to Houghton, 14 August 2007, ‘Post operation report Shawforce
Jan-Aug 07’.
94
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 16 August 2007, ‘Iraq
Senior Officials Group’.
221