The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
priorities
for government: reconciliation; tackling rebels and harnessing
grass‑roots
popular
support including among the Kurds and Sunnis. Prime Minister Maliki
described
proposals
for offering an amnesty to those who would lay down their arms
which might
be put to
Parliament in a week or two.
395.
On 8 January,
Mr Blair’s Private Secretary wrote to Mrs Beckett’s
Private
Secretary:
“We are
entering an important new phase in the coalition effort in Iraq, as
– following
the US
review and in the light of our plans in Basra – we and the US
attempt to help
the Iraqi
government entrench genuine change and progress in the areas of
security,
reconstruction
and reconciliation. The Prime Minister judges that our present
level of
effort
should be stepped up in response. He would like to see a
qualitative change in
our ability
to monitor progress in these key areas, to identify blockages to
progress,
and to take
rapid action to fix these.”214
396.
The letter
asked for detailed reports and weekly updates on key areas,
specifically:
•
Weekly
reports on Basra: “The Prime Minister is concerned that at
present
the picture
emerging from Op SINBAD in terms of Iraqi security capability
and
economic/social
impact is mixed. He welcomes the work commissioned by
the
Iraq
Strategy Group to identify the detailed conditions we need to see
in Basra
before we
can re‑posture and draw down … The Prime Minister …
agrees
strongly
that we need urgently to improve our ability to deliver economic
effect
in theatre,
and that we need a joined‑up operation.”
•
A detailed
report on reconstruction efforts to date, identifying what has
been
done by the
US and others: “Better liaison with and understanding of the
US
programme
is essential” (see Section 10.2).
•
A detailed
account of the reconciliation activity currently under way
(see
Section 10.2).
•
Advice on
improving the UN effort in Iraq.
•
Weekly
reports on developments in ISF capability indicating details of
any
problems,
how these were to be tackled and by whom (see Section
12.1).
•
Advice on
the current state of the Iraqi justice system, including the degree
of
governmental
interference and how this might realistically be
addressed.
397.
In relation to
the points made in Maj Gen Shirreff’s letter of 29 December,
the
Private
Secretary wrote that Mr Blair:
“… agrees
strongly that we need urgently to improve our ability to deliver
economic
effect in
theatre and that we need a joined‑up operation. He retains an open
mind on
how best to
deliver this (and looks forward to the advice already commissioned
by
214
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 8 January 2007, ‘Iraq’.
74