The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
695.
Current UK
commitments were summarised as:
•
support for
basic training – 86 officers in Jordan, az‑Zubayr and
Baghdad;
including a
combination of serving and retired police officers and
MOD
police
officers, at a cost of £7.3m per annum from the GCPP
International
Peacekeeping
Fund;
•
enhancement
of capabilities in MND(SE) – six senior and middle‑ranking
officers
mentoring
Iraqi Provincial Chiefs of Police at a cost of £500,000 from the
GCPP
International
Peacekeeping Fund; 40 IPAs providing mentoring in the
South
(through
ArmorGroup), costing £4.8m for six months; and
•
enhancement
of national capabilities – Mr Davies’ role as Senior Civilian
Adviser,
reporting
to the Minister of Interior and supported by 12 officers in
advisory roles
at a cost
of £500,000 from the GCPP International Peacekeeping
Fund.
696.
Two new
priorities were identified arising from the 2005 Strategy: the
development
of national
strategies and the development of Iraqi intelligence capability.
Developing
a Special
Branch capability was still a UK priority but the Metropolitan
Police would
currently
not deploy staff to Baghdad on security grounds.
697.
The GCPP
International Peacekeeping Fund could cover existing commitments
but
was not
able to meet new ones. New expenditure would therefore fall to the
GCPP (Iraq)
fund. SSR
so far amounted to £5.5m for 2005/06, not including the project to
support the
MOI
(£2.57m) or the human rights programme (£950,000). While funding
was “available
for all
planned police activity for the next six months”, an extension of
the ArmorGroup
contract
for a further six months would create an overspend. That would
leave no
funding for
renewing other contracts, such as the Prison Mentoring Contract, or
for new
projects
such as additional support for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST– for
trying crimes
committed
under the Saddam Hussein regime).
698.
At the AHMGIR,
the FCO said the “key message” from the paper was that
funding
beyond
September was “extremely tight”.636
One of the
points made in discussion was:
“The
Government would need to be prepared to make tough decisions and
prioritise
carefully
on funding for activity in Iraq. There should be no expectation of
drawing
down on the
Treasury Reserve.”
699.
Officials were
tasked with taking forward funding issues, with the close
involvement
of the Home
Office and ACPO.
636
Minutes, 24
February 2005, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
210