The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
949.
Mr Blair
said that he still believed that Saddam Hussein had posed a
threat.
Without
military action against Iraq, there would not have been the
progress there had
been on
Libya, AQ Khan, Iran and North Korea.
950.
In his
statement to the House of Commons after the publication of the
Butler
Report,
Mr Blair said that Saddam Hussein “retained complete strategic
intent on WMD
and
significant capability”.
951.
In July,
Mr Blair told President Bush that the forthcoming ISG
Comprehensive
Report
could be a powerful argument in support of the war.
952.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald set out Mr Blair’s views on handling to Dr Rice on
4 October:
that the
failure to find stockpiles of WMD should be presented as
“yesterday’s story” and
the media
encouraged to focus on new material about strategic intent,
concealment and
sanctions
busting.
953.
Mr Blair
told President Bush on 5 October that the ISG Comprehensive
Report
“showed
that Saddam Hussein had a clear strategic intent to develop WMD”
and that
“terrorists
had chosen to make Iraq the battleground”.
954.
The ISG
Comprehensive Report was published on 6 October. It stated
that it had
been Saddam
Hussein’s strategic intent to “end sanctions while preserving the
capability
to
reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions
were lifted”, and
that in
seeking to preserve that capability his regime had breached UN
sanctions.
955.
Addressing the
state of Iraq’s WMD programmes in the years between the
1991
Gulf
Conflict and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Report concluded
that:
•
Iraq’s WMD
capability had mostly been destroyed in 1991.
•
There were
“no credible indications” that Iraq had resumed production
of
chemical
munitions after 1991.
•
There was
“no direct evidence” that, after 1996, Saddam Hussein had
plans
for a new
BW programme or was conducting BW-specific work for
military
purposes.
•
Iraq’s
ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons programme had
“progressively
decayed”
after 1991.
•
The 1991
Gulf War and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections had
brought
many of
Iraq’s delivery programmes to a halt, but because the UN had
permitted
development
and possession of delivery systems with a range of up to
150km,
Iraq was
“positioned … for a potential breakout capability”.
956.
Mr Blair
told the House of Commons on 13 October that:
“Those
people who want to pray in aid the Iraq Survey Group in respect of
stockpiles
of weapons
must also accept the other part of what the Iraq Survey
Group
said, which
is that Saddam retained the intent and the capability – the teams
of
610