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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
245.  The paper set out arguments for and against taking on an ORHA regional office.
The arguments in favour included:
the opportunity to influence ORHA at the operational as well as policy level; and
the possibility of promoting an “exemplary” approach to the relationship
between the civil and military arms of the Coalition if the ORHA region matched
the UK AOR.
246.  The arguments against were:
the reputational risks associated with creating a region where the UK had a
high profile (“If the Coalition Provisional Authority ran into difficulty … this would
impact on the UK’s standing in Iraq to a greater degree than if we remained a
(junior) partner in ORHA without a clear regional responsibility”);
limited resources; and
if ORHA/the US failed to provide resources for activities in the UK-led region, the
UK could be faced with the choice of finding resources itself or “being seen to
fail in the eyes of the local population and more widely”.
247.  Sir David advised Mr Blair:
“I think you will have to give firm direction. My own view is that we should accept
the risks and lead a regional office to cover area for which we have military
responsibility.”146
248.  Mr Blair chaired the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 17 April.147
249.  Ms Short expressed reservations about suggestions that DFID should fund the
extra staff for ORHA.
250.  Mr Blair concluded that ORHA:
“… was important in getting Iraq back on its feet. We should have influence inside
it. He was sympathetic to the British taking a regional lead in the Office, and wanted
the scoping study completed quickly so that final decisions could be made on our
participation. On the proposal for an additional contribution to the Office [ORHA],
work should proceed quickly to identify posts and potential candidates. The issue of
funding should be addressed … before Ministers met on 24 April. There should be
no bureaucratic hold up in sorting out this priority.”
251.  Mr Rycroft wrote to Mr McDonald later that day, confirming that it was Mr Blair’s
view that the UK should increase support for ORHA and that it should take on
146  Manuscript comment Manning to Prime Minister on Letter Drummond to Manning, 16 April 2003,
‘Iraq: Support for ORHA Regional Office’, attaching Paper IPU, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA Regional
Offices’.
147  Minutes, 17 April 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq’.
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