3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
1.
Following the
attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, Mr Blair became
increasingly
concerned
about the risk that international terrorists might acquire and use
weapons
of mass
destruction (WMD) and the threat that posed to the UK and its wider
interests.
He was
convinced that:
•
those risks
had to be dealt with;
•
Iraq was
only one element of that wider problem, but the risk changed the
way
the threat
posed by Iraq should be viewed; and
•
Iraq had to
be dealt with as a priority.
2.
This Section
of the report sets out the evidence relating to events leading
up
to
Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Crawford, the
meeting itself, and the
subsequent
statements in public and to Cabinet.
3.
The UK’s
assessments of Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missile
capabilities,
its intent to preserve and enhance those capabilities, and the
likelihood of
proliferation
from Iraq, are addressed in Section 4.1. That Section also
addresses the
initial
preparation of a document for publication on WMD programmes of
concern.
•
The UK
continued to pursue implementation of the “smarter” economic
sanctions
regime in
the first months of 2002, but continuing divisions between
Permanent
Members of
the Security Council meant there was no agreement on the way
forward.
•
In public
statements at the end of February and in the first week of March
2002, Mr
Blair and
Mr Straw set out the view that Iraq was a threat which had to be
dealt with.
•
At Cabinet on
7 March, Mr Blair and Mr Straw emphasised that no decisions
had
been taken
and Cabinet was not being asked to take decisions. Cabinet
endorsed
the
conclusion that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes
posed a
threat to
peace and endorsed a strategy of engaging closely with the US
Government
in order to
shape policy and its presentation.
•
At Crawford,
Mr Blair offered President Bush a partnership in dealing urgently
with
the threat
posed by Saddam Hussein. He proposed that the UK and the US
should
pursue a
strategy based on an ultimatum calling on Iraq to permit the return
of
weapons
inspectors or face the consequences.
•
Following his
meeting with President Bush, Mr Blair stated that Saddam Hussein
had
to be
confronted and brought back into compliance with the
UN.
•
The acceptance
of the possibility that the UK might participate in a military
invasion
of Iraq was
a profound change in UK thinking. Although no decisions had been
taken,
that became
the basis for contingency planning in the months
ahead.
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