The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
643.
In her weekly
report on 2 March, Dr Marsden wrote:
“This week
we have seen the Sadrists wondering how to respond to the
Prime
Minister’s
announcement and a direct approach from a Sadrist MP … to the
FCO.
This
approach is encouraging and suggests that there is a political
opportunity to be
exploited.
It also reinforces our sense that the Sadrists are still in
disarray, not just
here but
across the country …
“In
parallel with … [the Sadrists’] approach in London, there have been
some
tentative
indications here that OMS/JAM in Basra would like to lower
the
temperature
and de‑escalate things. But it is far from clear how much of the
Sadrist
spectrum …
[they] will be able to deliver and how they intend to deal with
the
Iranian‑controlled
extremist elements, who can be expected to go on attacking
us.
The current
lack of cohesion in the Sadrist camp underlines the need for
caution …
We should
certainly pursue this approach but will need to be clear where our
red
644.
On the same
date, Dr Marsden wrote to the Cabinet Office a second
time,
attaching
the third iteration of the Better Basra Plan.337
Attached to
the Plan were an
annex
setting out benchmarks, a detailed work plan for each element, an
estimate of
progress
against the benchmarks set in December 2006 and a cost estimate for
2007/08
which
totalled around £21m. The Plan had been drafted jointly by MND(SE),
the British
Embassy
Office Basra and the PRT and had been discussed in detail with the
US
Embassy
Regional Office in Basra.
645.
The Plan set
out “a comprehensive strategy for bringing Basra to the point where
it
can
transition to Provincial Iraqi Control”. Implementation of the Plan
would be led by the
Southern
Iraq Steering Group, bringing together civilian and military
efforts.
646.
The Plan
defined “realistic” political success as:
“•
Iraqi
leaders both at national and provincial level take the initiative
in arguing the
case for
PIC …
•
the
Provincial Government gains credibility bringing improvements to
ordinary
people’s
lives
•
a drop in
the level of intimidation … of those within the provincial
government
and
security apparatus …
•
a reduction
in malign Iranian influence and the removal from circulation
of
certain key
individuals
•
Iraqi
Government control sustained after PIC with no breakdown of
law
and order.”
336
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 2 March 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
337
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 2 March 2007, ‘Better Basra’.
120