The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
137.
Under the
heading “National Reconciliation”, the brief reported that
government
officials
working closely with the military were continuing to work on
initiatives to split
and isolate
Iranian special groups from criminal and nationalist elements of
JAM, in
an attempt
to reduce attacks on MND(SE) and counter Iranian influence in Iraq.
It was
suggested
that “elements of JAM are encouraged by recent detainee releases
and
would
consider negotiating a cease-fire”.
138.
In his weekly
update on 26 July, Maj Gen Shaw commented that the US
suggestion
that the UK should retain a presence in Basra Palace in order to
avoid giving
the
impression that JAM and Iran had triumphed was “both risk averse
but also a recipe
for UK
remaining in its current posture and force levels”.62
139.
Maj Gen Shaw
argued that such an approach would preclude “the middle
ground
of
harnessing latent Iraqi nationalism, allowing the Shia Iraqis to
sort their internal
problems
out for themselves”. There was no news from the US commanders in
Iraq
about
whether or not they would agree to UK withdrawal from Basra Palace
in the
timescale
proposed, beyond Gen Petraeus making clear that the decision on
the
readiness
of the Palace Protection Force was for him to take.
140.
Maj Gen Shaw
cautioned against assuming that silence from the US
indicated
assent.
141.
The
Assessments Staff reported to Mr McDonald on 26 July that the
number
of attacks
had remained steady at just over 900 in the preceding
week.63
Indirect
fire
attacks by
Shia militias had continued against Basra Air Station and Basra
Palace,
killing
four UK Service Personnel in separate incidents. There were some
indications
that
JAM leaders were seeking to influence the police not to
intervene in JAM attacks
on coalition
forces.
142.
Mr Brown
met ACM Stirrup on 27 July. The Government has been unable to
supply
a record of
this meeting, and believes that no minute was in fact
produced.64
143.
Mr McDonald
reported to Mr Brown that he met ACM Stirrup after
their
conversation
to follow up on the UK’s training contribution after the overwatch
phase.65
They agreed
that Mr Brown’s line to take at a forthcoming press conference
should be
that the
final decision had not yet been taken but that the UK would not
leave Basra
Palace
until military commanders were satisfied that the necessary
conditions for
departure
had been met.
144.
Those
conditions were that the Iraqi forces were able to protect the
compound and
were
capable of taking lead responsibility for security in Basra City
centre.
62
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 26 July 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 26
July 2007’.
63
Minute
Tillbrook to McDonald, 26 July 2007, ‘Iraq Intelligence Update – 26
July 2007’.
64
Email
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Hammond, 16 June 2014,
‘Possible missing document’.
65
Minute
McDonald to Prime Minister, 27 July 2007, ‘Iraq’.
210