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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
336.  When Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January, it was clear that the
window for peaceful disarmament would only be a few weeks. The military
campaign could begin around 10 March.
337.  Mr Blair and President Bush had a two hour meeting in Washington on 31 January
followed by a press conference and an informal dinner.117 The discussions are
addressed in Section 3.6.
338.  On military planning, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the possibility that
Iraqi forces would fold quickly. Mr Blair asked about planning for the post-conflict period.
In his view a UN badge would be needed. That would help with the humanitarian
problems. Mr Blair and President Bush discussed an initial military occupation, how to
handle the dilemma of managing the transition to civil administration and the nature of
an Iraqi government.
339.  Mr Blair concluded that the US and UK needed to prepare to organise on a
“war footing”, working very closely together “particularly on our public communications”.
340.  Sir David Manning recorded that it was clear that the window of opportunity would
be only a few weeks. Otherwise the US would take military action. The military campaign
could begin “around 10 March”, and earlier if Dr Blix’s report on 14 February was tough.
The timing was “very tight”.
341.  The Inquiry asked Mr Blair at what point he had concluded that the US “had
definitely decided on military action in March 2003”.118
342.  In his statement for the Inquiry, Mr Blair wrote:
“It was clear from continuing discussion with the US in late 2002/early 2003 that
March was the likely date for military action. That firmed up as it became plain that
there was no significant shift in the attitude of Saddam. The December Declaration
… was incomplete, as Blix noted … His first report was to the effect that there was
not full compliance, essentially around interviews. There were various possible
alternatives to military action surfacing, including proposals for Saddam peacefully
to give up power.”119
Planning for an air campaign
THE UK CONTRIBUTION TO AN AIR CAMPAIGN
343.  On 31 January, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair, advising him that he intended to
announce the agreed air package on 6 February.120
117  Letter Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with
President Bush on 31 January’.
118  Statement Request for Rt Hon Tony Blair, 13 December 2010, page 6.
119  Statement, 14 January 2011, page 11.
120  Letter Hoon to Prime Minister, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Announcement of Air Package’.
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