9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

909. Having seen the letter to Mr Rycroft, Mr Straw also offered his thoughts on “political

aspects” of the deployment, in a letter from his Private Secretary.502 Mr Straw endorsed

the MOD’s initial instinct to analyse the US request carefully. He observed that sending

the ARRC to Iraq:

“… would preclude its possible deployment to Afghanistan … probably until well

into 2006. This would complicate the prospects of delivering our objectives in

Afghanistan. But we may have to recognise that Iraq is the higher priority and the

(even harder) theatre to which to attract and retain international troop contributors.”

910. Having read the letter from Mr Straw’s Private Secretary, Mr Bowen also supplied

advice to Mr Rycroft.503

911. Mr Bowen advised that the deciding factor ought to be whether taking on

wider responsibility would make a difference to the Coalition’s strategic success in

Iraq. Providing more troops for the sake of “burden sharing” was not, in his view,

advisable but doing so in the realistic hope that it would have a strategic impact was

potentially worthwhile.

912. The JIC assessed the degree to which Iran might have supported or encouraged

Shia violence on 21 April.504 It judged that Iran continued to want to see a stable and

non-threatening Iraq. Although there was a suggestion that some Iranians might have

offered support to Muqtada al-Sadr:

“Iran has not been behind attacks on Coalition Forces. It did not have foreknowledge

of Muqtada al-Sadr’s actions and probably has not provided any significant support

to al-Sadr’s followers in the recent violence. But it would probably support a violent

Iraqi response to the Coalition if military action against al-Sadr in Najaf resulted in

heavy Shia casualties.”

913. On 22 April, Mr Blair told Cabinet that Mr Richmond considered that calm could

be restored in Basra providing the military confrontation in Fallujah was resolved

“satisfactorily”.505

914. In conversations on 23 April, Sir David Manning urged Dr Rice and Mr Blair urged

President Bush to delay the operation.506

502 Letter Owen to Rycroft, 22 April 2004, ‘Iraq: US approaches for additional UK forces in Iraq’.

503 Minute Bowen to Rycroft, 23 April 2004, ‘Iraq: responding to US approaches for additional forces’.

504 JIC Assessment, 21 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Iranian Activity and Influence’.

505 Cabinet Conclusions, 22 April 2004.

506 Letter Manning to Rycroft, 23 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah: Call on Condi Rice’; Letter Rycroft to Adams,

23 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Bush’.

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