1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
The French
experts “noted that the decontaminant could also have been used for
…
chemical
destruction of biological warfare agents”.
There was
“no obvious explanation” for the presence of compounds in the
June/July
samples
which were “completely absent” from the April samples.
The US
laboratory reported that it had re-evaluated all activities to
confirm that no cross-
contamination
or other mistakes had occurred.
As a result
of further French investigation, ethyl – and methyl – phosphoric
compounds
could no
longer be confirmed in two samples.
582.
After
intensive consultations, a letter from the President of the
Security Council
to
Mr Annan was agreed on 30 October, “describing the
Council’s initial views” on the
proposed
comprehensive review of Iraqi compliance in two phases: the first
dedicated
to
disarmament and the second other requirements, including those
relating to Kuwaiti
missing
persons and property.234
The letter
reflected a consensus that the assessment
should be
designed to lead to the definition of an agreed course of action
and timetable
which, if
followed, would allow the Council to act.
583.
On the evening
of 31 October, the National Monitoring Directorate of Iraq
(NMD)
informed
UNSCOM’s representative in Baghdad that the Revolutionary
Command
Council and
the Ba’ath Party had decided “to suspend, stop or cease all
activities of
the Special
Commission, including monitoring”.235
Iraq made
clear that it was not asking
the
monitoring teams to leave Iraq and its cameras and other equipment
would remain
in place.
The IAEA would be allowed to continue its monitoring activities,
provided they
were
independent of UNSCOM.
584.
In a statement
to the press on 31 October, the President of the Security
Council
reported
that the members had “unanimously condemned” Iraq’s decision
and
demanded
that it should be rescinded “immediately and
unconditionally”.236
Once
Iraq
had
rescinded this decision, and its decision of 5 August to limit
co-operation, the
members of
the Council remained ready “to implement a comprehensive review of
Iraq’s
compliance”.
585.
The statement
described Iraq’s decision and the continuing restrictions on the
work
of the IAEA
as “deeply disturbing”. The Council would “remain actively seized
of this
matter, in
order to ensure the full implementation of the relevant resolutions
and secure
peace and
security in the region”.
234
UN Security
Council, ‘3939th Meeting Thursday 5 November 1998’
(S/PV.3939).
235
UN Security
Council, 31 October 1998, ‘Letter dated 31 October 1998
from the Deputy Executive
Chairman of
the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General
pursuant to paragraph
9 (b) (i)
of Security Council resolution 687 (1991 addressed to the President
of the Security Council’
(S/1998/1023).
236
UN Security
Council Press Statement, 31 October 1998, ‘Text: UNSC Condemns
Iraq’s decision on
weapons
inspectors’.
133