The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
62.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary asked for immediate advice from Lt Gen Fry on
what
action
Prime Minister Maliki needed to take, and more detailed advice
later that week
on how
to address the shortcomings of the ISF.
63.
Mr Browne’s
Private Secretary replied the following day, attaching advice
from
Lt Gen
Fry.49
He advised
that Mr Blair should press Prime Minister Maliki
to:
•
re‑emphasise
the theme of national unity;
•
carry out
“vigorous internal reform” of the Ministry of Interior and sack
those
engaged in
militia activity;
•
agree a
plan to engage the militia politically and militarily;
•
re‑vamp the
Baghdad Security Plan to create “a localised effect by
concentrating
force in a
specific area” which could then be expanded; and
•
tell
Muqtada al‑Sadr that he must choose between politics and
“populist
adventurism”.
64.
Lt Gen Fry
advised that in Basra the structure needed to oversee the Security
Plan
must be
established and allowed to act independently, with broad political
guidance, to
“prevent
the over‑centralisation of powers” which was open to
abuse.
65.
By the time
Major General Richard Shirreff took over as GOC MND(SE) in
mid‑July,
there had
not yet been agreement on the implementation arrangements of the
Basra
Security
Plan.50
In
particular no overall Iraqi security co‑ordinator had been
appointed.
The
Provincial Council, however, had voted to replace the Basra Chief
of Police.
66.
Lieutenant
General Sir Richard Shirreff told the Inquiry that his objective
had been
to achieve
PIC in the four provinces within MND(SE).51
In order to
achieve this, his
“overriding
preoccupation was to establish security”. He explained that, when
he arrived
there was
“effectively no security at all”, with movement significantly
constrained and
“a significant
lack of troops on the ground”. He continued:
“The result
of all that was what I call a cycle of insecurity. No security
meant no
reconstruction
and development. It meant a loss of consent, the militia filled the
gap
and,
effectively, the militia controlled the city. So my objective was
to re‑establish
security in
Basra.”
67.
Lt Gen
Shirreff told the Inquiry that his sense had been that the
overriding theme in
the
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) was accelerated transition and
“the gravity of
the
[security] situation was not fully appreciated”.52
He
concluded that “the focus was to
exit rather
than achieving adequate success”.
49
Letter
McNeil to Banner, 11 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Security’ attaching Minute
Fry to MA/Secretary of State
[MOD], 11
July 2006, ‘Iraq: Security’.
50
Minute
Cooper, 13 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 13 July
2006’.
51
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 2-4.
52
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, pages 10‑11.
14