The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Basra
Governorate Co‑ordinator. UKTI, DFID and the British Council had
identified staff
to work in
the new office. If circumstances and resources allowed, the
“Bilateral Unit”
would
oversee the establishment of a substantive “British Transitional
Office”.
288.
Mr Hogger
explained on 2 January 2004 that there was “little to report yet
on
implementing
the Prime Minister’s wish for the establishment of a British Office
in
Basra”.202
He hoped
that a visit by security experts in January would make
progress
on
identifying possible premises for an “embryonic British Office” and
the eventual
Consulate.
He advised that, in the current security climate, the British
Office would
almost
certainly have to be housed in the CPA/UK military compound, which
was
already overcrowded.
289.
On 15 November
2003, the Iraqi Governing Council announced an
accelerated
timetable
for the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi transitional
administration, with the
CPA to be
dissolved by 30 June 2004 (see Section 9.2).
290.
Hard
Lessons,
Mr Stuart Bowen’s account, as US Inspector General for
Iraq
Reconstruction,
of the US experience of reconstruction between 2002 and
2008,
described
the impact of the new timetable:
“Reconstruction
plans that had just been devised on a two‑year timetable now
had
to shift,
and the rush began to prepare Iraq’s government to stand on its own
in
291.
On 5 December,
Sir Hilary Synnott advised the FCO that the compressed
timetable
made
adequate staffing more important than ever. Recruitment needed to
look beyond
the
dissolution of the CPA. The UK would need to sustain “an intensive
development
co‑operation/technical
assistance relationship” with Iraq and “might usefully
maintain
an
international co‑ordination role. This will require a careful
transitional process with
maximum use
of acquired experience.”
292.
Sir Michael
Jay visited Iraq from 21 to 23 January 2004 to discuss the
implications
of the
transfer of sovereignty with UK staff in Baghdad and
Basra.204
He
discussed his
findings
with Mr Straw on 29 January.205
293.
On 6 February,
Sir Michael submitted formal recommendations for an
Embassy
in Baghdad,
a Consulate General in Basra and an office in either Kirkuk or
Mosul.206
202
Telegram 1
CPA Basra to FCO London, 2 January 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to
Basra: Scenesetter’.
203
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing Office,
2009.
204
Minute Jay
to Secretary of State [FCO], 26 January 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq: 21‑23
January’.
205
Manuscript
comment Adams to PS/PUS [FCO], 30 January 2004, on Minute Jay to
Secretary of State
[FCO], 26
January 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq: 21‑23 January’.
206
Minute Jay
to Foreign Secretary, 6 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Post‑Transition
Representation’ attaching
Paper,
‘Future UK Representation in Iraq’.
294