The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Commander in theatre] to fulfil the expanding range of tasks for UK forces in

Multi-National Division (South-East) …”

373.  To meet the immediate requirement, the rest of 2nd Battalion the Light Infantry

– one company of which was already in Iraq – would be deployed from Cyprus along

with 1st Battalion the Royal Green Jackets, plus some specialist personnel. They would

remain in Iraq until around November.

374.  By 11 September, reporting from Iraq suggested that the Constitutional Preparatory

Committee would recommend to the GC that membership of the Constitutional

Convention, which would lead the process of drafting Iraq’s Constitution, should be

decided by nationwide elections.220

375.  The report also said that the fatwa issued by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani at the

beginning of July was “exerting enormous influence” on their deliberations.

376.  Elections would mean delay, which Mr Richmond anticipated might lead to a push

for the early restoration of Iraqi sovereignty, through the GC. Ambassador Bremer did

not consider that a viable option.

377.  Mr Richmond commented that it was:

“… also impractical: a transfer of sovereignty which left – as it would have

to do – security, and given the US financial investment, economic/financial

issues in Coalition hands would be pretty meaningless.”

378.  Mr Straw updated Cabinet on Iraq on 11 September.221 He reported that the

security situation was uncertain after the terrorist incidents of the summer; greater

international involvement was required.

379.  A new Security Council resolution was being negotiated, and Mr Annan was

holding a meeting of Foreign Ministers to address outstanding issues. Mr Blair observed

that improved Iraqi capacity to provide security for themselves was essential.

380.  As requested by Mr Blair and President Bush, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice a

note “which seeks to define our objectives and specify ongoing and future actions” on

11 September.222 It covered security, intelligence, infrastructure, media and personnel.

381.  The objectives were:

• Security: stabilise the security situation quickly and achieve visible momentum

before the onset of Ramadan in late October. Change the emphasis from static

guarding to proactive operations.

220  Telegram 162 IraqRep to FCO London, 11 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Process’.

221  Cabinet Conclusions, 11 September 2003.

222  Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 11 September 2003, ‘Iraq’ attaching Note 10 Downing Street, 10 September

2003, ‘Iraq: UK/US Action Plan 10 September’.

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