The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1096.
A Cabinet
Office paper on 13 June reported that the UK contribution to
the
Ministerial
Transition Teams was:
•
MOI: five
international consultants (working in rotation) and two military
officers.
The focus
was on management and administrative capacity‑building,
including
strategic
planning, improving administrative controls and accountability,
clarifying
the legal
and constitutional framework and human resource
management.
•
IMOD: seven
full-time advisers (MOD), including the Team
Leader/Senior
Advisor who
was responsible for directly advising the Minister. The team
focused
on
establishing a functional Secretariat, strengthening contracting
procedures
and
developing the Inspector General Group.1019
1097.
A Report to
Congress on 30 November stated that the MOI “was
currently
assessed as
being partly effective overall”.1020
The MOI
Transition Team had “just over
100
advisers”:
•
Seven were
from the US State Department.
•
Three were
from the US Department of Justice.
•
45 were
from the US military.
•
“just over
a third” were contractors (Military Professional Resources
Inc).
•
The rest
were non‑US military and civilian personnel.
1098.
The IMOD
Transition Team contained “just under 50 advisers”:
•
The
majority were contractors (Military Professional Resources
Inc).
•
Six were US
military personnel.
•
12 were
civilian advisers.
1099.
A “similarly
scaled effort” was provided at Joint Headquarters, with US
military
personnel
making up roughly half and the rest split between US contractors
and
personnel
from coalition countries.
1100.
On 17 January
2007, the JIC repeated its concerns about the IMOD and the
MOI
but did
note some small signs of improvement in the Ministries,
stating:
“The
Ministerial Committee for National Security – chaired by [Prime
Minister]
Maliki – is
taking on more strategic planning. The MOD has benefited from
MNF
engagement,
performing better than the MOI. We judge that both ministries
are
better able
to direct their forces, albeit inconsistently. Some efforts have
been made
to correct
deep‑seated problems. But the lack of united national political
direction is
reflected
in Iraq’s security machinery which remains largely un‑coordinated
and, we
1019
Paper
Cabinet Office, 13 June 2006, ‘Follow‑up to the Prime Minister’s
visit, including Delivering a
Step‑Change
in Basra’ attaching Annex B ‘Capacity‑building Assistance
(Excluding Direct Support from
UK Missions
in Iraq)’.
1020
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
310