The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The US and
UK had become “very impatient in the first days of March”,
and
UNMOVIC had
not been left “to finish the task”.
•
The
presumed threat from Iraq could have been controlled through
inspections.
•
He did not
accept the US view that “the war with Iraq was a way of
sending
a sign to
other countries to preclude their acquisition of weapons of
mass
destruction”.
If a country felt its security was assured, it would not have the
need
to think
about WMD. That was the first line of defence against the
proliferation of
WMD. North
Korea now wanted nuclear arms to fend off others.
68.
At the Ad Hoc
Meeting on Iraq on 12 April, Mr Straw stated that the UK
Permanent
Mission to
the UN in New York (UKMIS New York) would be challenging Dr Blix on
the
media story
that the British had fabricated evidence about Iraq’s
WMD.31
69.
UKMIS New York
reported that, at the meeting of the Security Council on
22 April,
Dr Blix had
said:
“… some
recent reports of his comments – translated from foreign
languages
into
English – had contained serious errors. It was true that he had
pointed to
weaknesses
in intelligence provided, but he had also always stressed the
need
for
intelligence and the difficulties agencies faced. He had not
suggested that
any
government had fabricated evidence. In addition he had indeed said
that
US patience
seemed to run out at the same time as the Iraqis had become
more
proactive.
But if asked about the causal link, his view would be that the
Iraqis had
become more
active when they had seen that time was running
out.”32
70.
In a statement
to the House of Commons on 14 April, Mr Blair
reported:
“… of 146
possible sites known to us, investigations have begun in seven but,
in any
event, we
know that for six months before the return of UN inspectors, Saddam
put
in place a
systematic campaign of concealment of weapons of mass
destruction.
Until we
are able to interrogate the scientists and experts who worked on
the
programmes,
and the UN has a list of some 5,000 names, progress is bound to
be
slow. A
specialised team, however, is beginning work and we are in
discussion with
allies and
the UN as to what the future role of the UN in such a process may
be.”33
71.
In his
conversation with President Bush on 14 April, Mr Blair
stated that there was a
need to
manage media expectations in the search for WMD and suggested there
should
be no
hesitation in offering amnesty in exchange for concrete information
on WMD.34
31
Minutes,
12 April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
32
Telegram
705 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
UNMOVIC: 22 April’.
33
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
14 April 2003, column 616.
34
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s conversation with Bush,
14 April’.
438