3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
identified
might refuse because of fear for their lives or those of their
families. If Dr Blix
would not
use the powers in resolution 1441, he would “have to
go”.
256.
Sir David
reported that he had also “raised the question of British
energy
companies”.
He “hoped they would be treated fairly and not overlooked if Saddam
left
the scene
and new oil and gas concessions were being allocated”.
257.
Dr Rice
had responded that:
“… it would
be particularly unjust if those energy companies who had
observed
the
sanctions regime …. were not among the beneficiaries in a
post‑Saddam Iraq.
She knew
UK companies belonged in this category.”
258.
Sir David
concluded:
“Condi’s
mood has hardened substantially since the NATO Prague Summit in
favour
of early
military action. (This may be fuelled by a President who is
increasingly
uncomfortable
with pressure inside the Republican Party, and riled by
Saddam’s
taunts).
She does not expect the inspections process to produce
conclusive
(perhaps
not even convincing) evidence. This is prompting her insistence
that
we must
make clear that the burden of proof is on Saddam, not us … From
this
evidence I
think there is a real risk that the Administration will overdo the
pressure
on Blix:
they might force him into resignation with damaging repercussions
…
“The mood
of the Administration could shift again. But on present form they
look
intent on
military action in February/March. We need to ensure that they use
the next
two to
three months to build the strongest possible case that Saddam is in
material
breach; and
then secure the widest possible international coalition of support
for
action
expressed through a second … resolution. We are in for a tough few
weeks.
Your
influence with Bush will be critical.”
259.
Sir David
recommended:
•
co‑ordinating
US and UK reactions to the Iraqi declaration and asking
pointed
questions
exposing its shortcomings, “putting the onus on Saddam to
explain
and
justify”;
•
impressing
on Dr Blix the need for a “robust and energetic inspections
regime,
including a
programme of interview” while discouraging the US
Administration
from
putting such pressure on him that he “denounces them and/or
resigns”;
•
making
“maximum efforts to find a smoking gun”, ideally “a top level
defector …
willing to
testify publicly about Saddam’s WMD programme.
Sir Richard
Dearlove
and Mr Tenet were “on the case”;
•
building up
“the dossier on Saddam’s pattern of deception and
obstruction,
eg pieces
of intelligence showing that he is moving equipment around,
has
destroyed
documentation, etc”; and
47