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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
431.  In a new list of “key deductions”, the SPG advised:
“Given fractious nature of Iraqi politics, broad regional concern on nature of new
Iraqi government, and poor state of Iraqi infrastructure, delivery of stated post-
conflict objectives will require lengthy engagement.
“Successful post-conflict delivery of US support to a new, broad-based government
will require co-operation and agreement of regional states on acceptability of the
outcome, if its efforts are not to be undermined.”
432.  The SPG also listed strategic issues needing resolution before there could be a
“winning concept”. They included:
the “likely model for Iraqi governance, security structures, and economy, to
inform estimates of post-conflict engagement”; and
the likely post-conflict role of the UN.
433.  In the section on post-conflict tasks, the list of likely short-, medium- and long-term
post-conflict military tasks from earlier versions was replaced with a briefer description
of planning priorities. The SPG stated that US military planners were working on detailed
post-conflict plans, but drawing on very broad assumptions about the nature of the new
regime. The SPG recommended that:
“… clarity and broad agreement on [the] following is needed before coherent plans
can be effectively delivered:
Political. Nature of regime, extent of franchise, land tenure, and relations
with other states.
Economic. Ownership and redevelopment of oil resources and
development of other economic activity.
Security. Security structures and security sector reform (SSR). Purpose,
size and nature of Iraqi Armed Forces and internal security forces.”
434.  The SPG continued:
“Planning will need to be undertaken with DFID in order to effectively manage
[the] NGO response to humanitarian consequences. Saddam may well use mass
movement of refugees as an operational tool to slow Coalition advance and as part
of a strategic attack on Coalition … domestic public support …
“Without clear post-conflict plans potential scale … of UK military commitment
remains an unknown.”
184
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