The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Brigade by
mid-March”. That would be followed by a period of Force Integration
Training
–
preparation and rehearsal alongside US forces – before they would
be properly
prepared to
conduct operations.
209.
Mr Hoon stated
that the force package was “broadly what the media
already
expect”,
but the “high visibility of the measures involved” would “require a
reasonably
candid
explanation”. He set out the advantages of the “earliest possible
announcement”.
210.
Mr Hoon
recommended that the UK should “inform the US that we agree
that
planning
should assume the contribution of the proposed UK land force
package to carry
out the
role the US has requested, subject to:
(i) the
overall caveat that a further political decision would be required
to commit
UK forces
to any specific operation
(ii) US
assistance in facilitating the bed-down of UK forces, and provision
of logistic
support
(iii)
further work to develop a satisfactory plan for the
aftermath.”
211.
Copies of the
letter were sent to Mr Brown, Mr Straw and Sir Andrew
Turnbull.
212.
The UK’s
assessment of Iraq’s conventional military capability and decisions
on
targeting
are addressed later in this Section.
213.
The risks
taken on procurement of equipment and its deployment to the front
line
are
addressed in Section 6.3.
214.
The absence of
advice on what might constitute a satisfactory plan for
the
aftermath
or on the risks associated with deploying UK forces before
decisions had been
made on the
scope or duration of their post-conflict role is addressed in
Section 6.5.
215.
On 17
January, Mr Blair agreed the deployment of large scale UK
ground
forces,
comprising the HQ 1 (UK) Div and three combat
brigades.
216.
Commenting on
Mr Hoon’s letter to Mr Blair, Sir David Manning wrote:
“As briefed
to you yesterday …
“Are you
content with the recommendations …?
“These seem
right, subject to your views on an announcement on
Monday
20 January.
This is bound to have significant impact. In any event, I assume
you will
217.
On 16 January,
Mr Straw raised his concerns that the momentum in
Washington
was to do
something soon after the report from Dr Hans Blix, Executive
Chairman of
68
Manuscript
comment Manning, 16 January 2003, on Letter Hoon to Blair, 16
January 2003,
‘Iraq: UK
Land Contribution’.
416