The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
first steps
had been taken. The non-permanent members of the Security Council
were
uncomfortable
with a situation where, “following the French decision to veto”,
the
Permanent
Members were “not shouldering their responsibilities properly”. The
“outcome
in the
Security Council remained open”. If the United Nations process
broke down,
difficult
decisions would be required and there would be another Cabinet
meeting at
which the
Attorney General would be present.259
665.
Mr Straw
said that, although there were differences between members of
the
Security
Council, “none was saying that Iraq was complying with its
international
obligations”;
and that it “followed that Iraq continued to be in material breach”
of those
obligations.
666.
On the legal
basis for military action, Mr Straw said that he “was already
on record
setting out
the position to the Foreign Affairs Committee”. Mr Straw
rehearsed the
negotiating
history of the resolution 1441, stating that:
•
“the French
and Russians had wanted a definition of what would constitute
a
material
breach, but had settled for the facts being presented to the
Security
Council”;
•
“they had
also wanted a statement that explicit authorisation was required
for
military
action and instead had settled for further consideration by the
Security
Council …”;
and
•
failure by
Iraq to comply with resolution 1441 “revived the
authorisations
existing”
in resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991).
667.
Mr Straw
noted that the Government’s supporters had “a clear preference”
for
a second
resolution but it “had not been seen as an absolute necessity”.
There had
been “good
progress” in New York in “gaining the support of uncertain
non-permanent
members of
the Security Council, including Mexico and Chile”.
668.
Quoting from
her diary, Ms Short wrote that she had asked for “a special
Cabinet
with the
Attorney General present” and this had been agreed. She also
reported saying,
“if we have
UN mandate, possible progress on Palestine/Israel and try with the
second
resolution
process, it would make a big difference”. She was “hopeful of
progress”.260
669.
Ms Short had
been advised by Mr Suma Chakrabarti, the DFID
Permanent
Secretary,
that she should focus her intervention in Cabinet on the need for
“a proper
decision-making
process”, which would be “important both in substance and … for
the
politics”.
In his view, there were two key points to make:
“Cabinet
needs to discuss now the legal opinion of the Attorney General and
how
to make
it public. This is vital for Ministers, our Armed Services and the
Civil Service.
259
Cabinet
Conclusions, 13 March 2003.
260
Short
C. An
Honourable Deception: New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of
Power. The Free
Press, 2004.
120