6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
was
possible and desirable but now “in the balance and time was running
out”. The end
of October
deadline for UK decisions was “inextricably” tied to military
action from the
first week
of January. If the US start date was later, then the timetable for
UK decisions
could be
later.
828.
Adm Boyce was
“not prepared at this juncture, to recommend that the UK
offer
a Package 3
type contribution that would arrive some time after the US [Main
Effort]
of end‑Feb”.
He directed that further advice should be provided to Mr Hoon
on the
options for
UK participation.
829.
A report of
the meeting from Mr Oakden observed that Adm Boyce
understood
the
interaction between the United Nations Security Council resolution
and a decision
on Package
3, but “was emphatic that the UK forces had to be there for the
start, or
830.
Mr Bowen
reported the discussion to Sir David Manning, pointing out
that the “the
US did not
think that land forces in Turkey were ruled out, but they certainly
had not
been ruled
in either”.333
Following
the Turkish elections in early November, it could be
45 days
before a new government was formed. Mr Bowen concluded by
stating that
“the key
question about Turkish attitudes is far from
resolved”.
831.
Mr Bowen
also reported that the MOD wanted a structure that would allow
them
to
“integrate offers of coalition participation” and was concerned
about the risk that
someone
else might take on that role.
832.
Cabinet was
informed on 24 October that negotiations on the UN
resolution
continued
and progress was “slow”.
833.
Mr Blair
said that Iraq would continue to be discussed at
Cabinet,
“including
in due time the military options”.
834.
A draft
resolution agreed by the US and UK was tabled in the Security
Council
835.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet on 24 October that discussions with the
Permanent
Members of
the Security Council and with others continued on a resolution on
Iraq.
It was
a long drawn‑out process and progress was slow.335
332
Minute
Oakden to Ehrman and Private Secretary [FCO], 23 October 2002,
‘Iraq Military Planning’.
333
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 24 October 2002, ‘Chief of Staff Meeting on 23
October’.
334
Telegram
2031 from UKMIS New York to FCO London, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
Draft Resolution
of 23
October’ .
335
Cabinet
Conclusions, 24 October 2002.
303