The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
162.
The record of
the meeting, described in more detail in Section 3.2, shows
that
Mr Blair
raised several post-conflict issues:
•
the need
for “a proper strategy for dealing with the Iraqi opposition”, one
that
was better
than anything Mr Blair had seen so far;
•
the need
“to guard against the law of unintended consequences” by
building
support in
the region;
•
the need
for “an acceptable successor government”; regime change was
not
163.
After the
meeting, Mr Blair commented that he thought the US was still
vague
about the
nature and role of the opposition inside and outside Iraq, and
unclear about
what would
follow Saddam Hussein. He asked for further advice.
164.
Sir David
Manning raised the issue at a meeting with Dr Rice in Washington
on
14 March
(see Section 3.2).104
165.
Sir David
recorded that he had “made it clear that we would continue to give
strong
support to
the idea of regime change, but were looking to the US to devise a
convincing
plan of
action. This would also need to answer the question of who would
follow
Saddam.”
166.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice that a series of issues would need to be
addressed
if the US
decided on military action against Iraq. One was whether the US
“wanted
company”.
If it wanted the support of a coalition, it would have to address a
number of
concerns
that would be critical in determining the attitude of potential
partners:
“… the US
would need to:
•
mount a
public information campaign explaining the nature of
Saddam’s
regime and
the threat he posed;
•
describe
the role that the US envisaged for the UN, and particularly for
the
weapons
inspectors;
•
provide a
convincing plan setting out how a combination of outside
military
pressure,
and external and internal opposition could topple Saddam;
and
•
provide an
equally convincing blueprint for a post Saddam Iraq …
acceptable
to its neighbours as well as to its own
population.
“…
Preparing public opinion and deciding who and what might replace
Saddam
were tough
propositions.”
103
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 11 March 2002, ‘Conversation between the Prime
Minister and
Vice President
Cheney: 11 March 2002’.
104
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 14 March 2002, ‘Discussions with Condi Rice on
12-13 March’.
142