The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
US as soon
as possible. The letter was copied to the FCO, DFID, the DTI and
the
Cabinet
Office.
271.
The No.10
paper stated that the cost of “reconstruction and nation building”
in Iraq
would be
between US$30bn and US$105bn, excluding the direct cost of conflict
and
post‑conflict
peacekeeping. Only an administration enjoying the legitimacy
provided by
the UN
would be free to engage with the financial markets to secure
funding for Iraq’s
long‑term
future.
272.
Mr Bowman
replied on 25 February, stating that the Treasury “fully supports
the
main
message of the paper, that, in the absence of a UN mandate, the
financing costs of
reconstructing
Iraq will be significantly higher”.163
Mr Bowman
offered detailed comments
on the text
and advised that the Treasury was already involved in complementary
work
alongside
the IPU and in liaison with the US and Australia.
273.
A revised
draft was prepared, but not shared with the US.164
274.
Mr David
Johnson, Head of the MOD Iraq Secretariat, wrote to Mr Hoon’s
Private
Office on
26 February about humanitarian assistance during the early stages
of a
military
conflict.165
The MOD and
DFID believed US plans for humanitarian assistance
were
inadequate, in particular because they relied on delivery by NGOs,
who would not
be on the
ground in Iraq in numbers early on. The UK military would therefore
need:
“…
immediate access to sufficient expertise and resources to … make
good the
deficiencies
in the US plans. In particular … DFID experts deployed in theatre,
who
can advise
what is actually required … (as opposed to soldiers making it up as
they
go along) …
There are lead‑times associated with this … Waiting till after a
second
SCR
[resolution] is leaving it too late. We know DFID haven’t got any
money. That is
why they
need to ask for some, now.”
275.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 27 February that he would continue to push for a
second
Security
Council resolution.166
276.
Ms Short
said that a UN legal mandate was “essential” for the humanitarian
and
reconstruction
tasks that lay ahead; without that, “proper preparation was
impossible”.
She also
advised that it would be “difficult” to accommodate action in Iraq
within DFID’s
Contingency
Reserve: “Greater resources were likely to be needed.”
277.
After that
meeting, Mr Boateng asked Treasury officials for a note on
progress
towards
financing Iraq’s reconstruction.167
Mr Boateng
commented:
163
Letter
Bowman to Heywood, 25 February 2003, [untitled].
164
Manuscript
comments Manning and Drummond on Email Heywood to Manning, 3 March
2003,
‘Financing
the Reconstruction of Iraq’.
165
Email
Sec(O)‑Iraq to SofS‑PS [MOD], 26 February 2003, ‘Humanitarian
Assistance’.
166
Cabinet
Conclusions, 27 February 2003.
167
Manuscript
comment Boateng on Letter Bewes to Heywood, 25 February 2003,
‘Iraq: Reconstruction –
Letter to
Mark Bowman (HM Treasury), 24 February 2003’.
488