9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
275.
The paper
invited Ministers to agree that Mr Miliband should circulate
detailed
proposals
on the UK’s future relations with Iraq, for agreement in
writing.
276.
At the
NSID(OD) meeting, Mr Brown outlined “strong progress” on the
UK’s four
key tasks
(training the Iraqi Army, promoting economic development, readying
Basra
Airport for
transfer to Iraqi control and preparing for provincial
elections).106
He told
those
present
that he would visit Iraq on 17 December.
277.
In discussion
of the future legal basis for military activity in Iraq, it was
observed
that it was
vital to avoid any risk of UK troops facing Iraqi jurisdiction;
without a legally
binding
agreement the UK would not be able to complete its
tasks.
278.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Brown concluded that the UK should keep up
the
pressure on
Prime Minister Maliki and his advisers to “see the proposed
agreement
through”
before his visit. Planning should proceed on the current proposed
timescale,
for now.
If a legal agreement looked unlikely before the Prime Minister’s
planned visit
“we should
re-consider our options then”.
279.
Mr Brown
also concluded that more should be done to improve
economic
development
and prospects for investment, including with Ministries in
Baghdad,
and that it
was also important to make progress on the Hydrocarbons Law
(see
Section 10.3).
280.
Ministers
agreed that sign off for the UK’s long term strategy for Iraq would
be
sought out
of committee.
281.
The following
day, Mr Prentice wrote to Prime Minister Maliki’s Adviser on
Foreign
Affairs,
attaching “a draft of the Exchange of Letters recording the tasks
to be completed
by the UK
forces and the timeframe agreed with Prime Minister Maliki last
week for their
withdrawal
from Iraq”.107
The letters
assumed that the Iraqi Government would submit
a “short
law” to the Council of Representatives on 16 December, to give UK
forces
“the necessary
jurisdictional protections”.
282.
Gen Dannatt
visited Iraq from 13 to 15 December and reported to ACM Stirrup
that
Basra
was:
“… marked
by a sense of great optimism: attacks are now the exception
rather
than the
rule; the Iraqi security forces are demonstrating impressive,
albeit nascent,
ability.
And there are early signs of a bustling city attempting to return
to normality.”108
106
Minutes, 9
December 2008, NSID(OD) meeting.
107
Letter
Prentice to al-Rikabi, 10 December 2008, [untitled].
108
Minute CGS
to Various, 15 December 2008, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 13-15 Dec
08’.
427