The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
on a UN
Security Council resolution (see Section 3.5), Sir Michael was
setting up a
“strategy
group” reporting to Mr Ricketts to ensure FCO work on Iraq was
“suitably
dynamic and
coherent”. The group would meet weekly; more often if
necessary.
405.
The Inquiry
has not seen a final version of that minute and it is not clear
whether
it was
seen by Mr Straw, but Mr Gray’s draft was seen by officials in
No.10.
406.
The Inquiry
has seen no further reference to an FCO “strategy group”,
but
Mr Ricketts
did chair the first “FCO Iraq Co-ordination Meeting” on 6
September.229
Among the
issues discussed was a paper on the consequences of military action
in the
region and
beyond being prepared by the Directorate of Strategy and Innovation
(DSI).
407.
It is not
clear whether officials from outside the FCO attended the meeting,
but the
record was
copied to the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff and to the MOD. It
was not
copied to
OD Sec.
408.
A second
meeting was scheduled for 18 September, but the Inquiry has seen
no
record of
it taking place.
409.
From
mid-September, Mr Ricketts was increasingly focused on the
negotiations for
what was to
become resolution 1441.
410.
In his witness
statement, Mr Stephen Pattison, Head of FCO United
Nations
Department
(UND), who was responsible for the formulation of policy on
Security
Council
resolutions and provided instructions to the UK Permanent Mission
to the UN in
New York
(UKMIS New York), explained that the key tactical decisions on how
to handle
negotiations
on the text were taken at twice daily meetings chaired by Mr
Ricketts.230
The instructions
were complemented by daily telephone conversations
between
Mr Ricketts
and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN,
and
by
correspondence with other members of UKMIS New
York.231
411.
The first
reference to Iraq in the minutes of the FCO Board during the
period
covered by
the Inquiry was on 20 September 2002, when members observed that
Iraq
had risen
up the agenda since August and asked whether the FCO was “prepared
for
a
crisis”.232
The Board
was informed by officials that work was in hand on how the
FCO
should
handle concurrent crises and on the possible need to commit
resources “in
preparation
for any need to move quickly into Baghdad”.
412.
Preparations
for the reopening of an Embassy in Baghdad are described
in
Section 15.1.
229
Minute [FCO
junior official] to Gray, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq Coordination
Meeting’.
230
Statement,
6 January 2011.
231
Public
hearing, 31 January 2011, pages 22-23.
232
Minutes, 20
September 2002, FCO Board.
180