3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
124.
Mr Straw’s
Private Office advised Sir David Manning on 26 February
that:
“In the
absence of any decisions on wider Iraq policy and the post-11
September
situation,
the immediate US focus is on getting the Goods Review List (GRL)
agreed
by the 30
May deadline.”42
125.
Once the GRL
was implemented, there was:
“… an
expectation, if UN credibility is to be maintained, that the
Security Council
would begin
discussions on clarification of SCR 1284 … The US are reluctant
to
go down
this route, fearing that it represents a slippery slope towards a
weaker
inspection
regime. But it remains our view that, properly handled,
clarification would
work to our
advantage … If the Iraqis continued to resist a tough inspection
regime
or let the
inspectors in then reneged, the justification for any military
action would be
much
stronger. If, against all expectations UNMOVIC were allowed to do
their job,
this would
offer the best prospect of dealing with Iraq’s WMD.”
126.
The FCO wrote
that the US was talking to the Russians. If the French could
be
persuaded
to help, that could offer the prospect of P5 agreement on
clarification.
127.
Sir Derek
Plumbly warned on 27 February about the danger of turning
regime
change into
an objective, rather than an aspiration.
128.
Sir Derek
also identified progress on Palestine as a necessary, but
not
sufficient,
condition for moving forward on regime change in Iraq.
129.
Sir Derek
Plumbly, British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia wrote to Sir Michael
Jay
on 27
February, warning:
“… we have
always said we want to see regime change. There is no harm in
saying
it now more
insistently perhaps, given that the Bush Administration have raised
the
issue to
the top of the international agenda. But to date we have presented
regime
change as
an aspiration, not an objective which we believe we (or the US
can
deliver).
If we cross that bridge definitively, it will be difficult to pull
back later.”43
130.
Sir Derek
argued that the UK did need to take account of the Arab
Street:
“Post 11
September I really do not see how we can disregard the depth of
anger
in our
Middle Eastern back yard … regimes may not fall in this part of the
world,
but instability
can manifest itself in different ways.”
42
Letter
Sedwill to Manning, 26 February 2002, ‘Iraq’.
43
Letter
Plumbly to Jay, 27 February 2002, ‘Iraq’.
409