9.8  |  Conclusions: The post-conflict period

phases with anything like the same strategic effect. The additional 360 troops deployed

by the UK could not have had the same effect as the more than 20,000 troops surged

into Baghdad and its environs by the US.

146.  At the end of 2006, tensions between the military and civilian teams in MND(SE)

became explicit. In a report to Mr Blair, Major General Richard Shirreff, General

Officer Commanding MND(SE), diagnosed that the existing arrangement, in which the

Provincial Reconstruction Team was located in Kuwait, “lacks unity of command and

unity of purpose”47 and proposed the establishment of a “Joint Inter-Agency Task Force”

in Basra led by the General Officer Commanding MND(SE).

147.  ACM Stirrup’s advice to Mr Blair was that it was “too late” to implement

Maj Gen Shirreff’s proposal. That may have been the right conclusion, but the effect

was to deter consideration of a real problem and of ways in which military and civilian

operations in MND(SE) could be better aligned.

148.  The adequacy of UK force levels in Iraq and the effectiveness of the UK’s efforts in

MND(SE) were explicitly questioned in Maj Gen Shirreff’s end of tour report.

Force Level Review

149.  The balance of forces between Iraq and Afghanistan was reviewed by DOP in

February 2007 on the basis that the UK could only sustain the enduring operational

deployment of eight battlegroups.

150.  ACM Stirrup’s “strong advice”,48 with which DOP agreed, was that the UK should

provide two additional battlegroups to the International Security Assistance Force in

Afghanistan, reducing the Iraq to Afghanistan battlegroup ratio from 6:2 to 5:3 and

then 4:4.

151.  This advice did not include an assessment of either the actual state of security in

Basra or the impact on the UK’s ability to deliver its objectives (including that drawdown

should be conditions-based) and responsibilities under resolution 1723 (2006). The

advice did identify US “nervousness” about the UK proposals.

152.  In early May, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, sought ACM

Stirrup’s advice on the future of the UK military presence in Iraq. ACM Stirrup advised

that the UK should press ahead with drawdown from Iraq on the basis that there was

little more the UK could achieve. There was “no militarily useful mission”.49

153.  Mr Blair was concerned about the implications of ACM Stirrup’s position unless

the political circumstances in Basra changed first. He commented: “it will be very hard

47  Letter Shirreff to Blair, 29 December 2006, [untitled].

48  Paper MOD officials, 13 February 2007, ‘Iraq and Afghanistan: balancing military effort in 2007’.

49  Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq’.

495