The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
tasks to be
achieved in a 10‑day timeline.120
Sir Jeremy
reported that France, Germany
and Russia
all said that the draft resolution without operative paragraph 3
would still
authorise
force. The UK had not achieved “any kind of breakthrough” and there
were
“serious
questions about the available time”, which the US would “not help
us to satisfy”.
257.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 13 March that work continued in the UN to obtain a
second
resolution
and, following the French decision to veto, the outcome remained
open.121
258.
Mr Straw
described President Chirac’s position as
“irresponsible”.
259.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet that there was “good progress” in gaining support in
the
Security
Council.
260.
Mr Blair
concluded that the French position “looked to be based on a
calculation
of
strategic benefit”. It was “in contradiction of the Security
Council’s earlier view that
military
action would follow if Iraq did not fully and unconditionally
co‑operate with the
inspectors”.
The UK would “continue to show flexibility” in its efforts to
achieve a second
resolution
and, “if France could be shown to be intransigent, the mood of the
Security
Council
could change towards support for the British draft”.
261.
Mr Blair
agreed the military plan later on 13 March.122
262.
On 13 March,
Mr Blair and President Bush discussed withdrawing the
resolution
on 17 March
followed by a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave within 48
hours.
There would
be no US military action until after the vote in the House of
Commons on
263.
Mr Blair
continued to press President Bush to publish the Road Map on the
Middle
East Peace
Process because of its impact on domestic opinion in the UK as well
as its
strategic
impact.
264.
Reporting
developments in New York on 13 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
warned
that the UK
tests had attracted no support, and that the US might be ready to
call a halt
to the UN
process on 15 March.124
The main
objections had included the “perceived
authorisation
of force in the draft resolution” and a desire to wait for
UNMOVIC’s own list
of key
tasks which would be issued early the following week.
265.
President
Chirac told Mr Blair on 14 March that France was “content to
proceed
‘in the
logic of UNSCR 1441’; but it could not accept an ultimatum or any
‘automaticity’
of recourse
to force”.125
He proposed
looking at a new resolution in line with
120
Telegram
428 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK
Circulates Side‑Statement’.
121
Cabinet
Conclusions, 13 March 2003.
122
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
123
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Timetable’.
124
Telegram
438 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 13
March’.
125
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President Chirac,
14 March’.
36