6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
CENTCOM
planners seemed to be dreaming up an ever larger area of Iraq for
the UK
to administer”.209
The Chiefs
of Staff had advised Mr Blair that it would be easier
for
the UK to
play a smaller post-conflict role if it was part of a Coalition
fighting force; the
opposite
now seemed to be the case. Sir David had said that:
“[Mr Richard]
Armitage [US Deputy Secretary of State] was talking of
military
administration
for two years. The Pentagon seemed to be more sensible,
talking
of six
months. Did we [the UK] not need to reduce our 40,000 troops to
around
5,000 by
the end of six months? And who would pay for all this? Some on the
US
side seemed
to be saying: you pay for what you administer.”
488.
Mr Ehrman
had suggested to Sir David that if the UK were to take on a
sector
it should
be getting as many like-minded allies as possible to join
it:
“We should
use the Anglo-Italian and Anglo-Spanish summits for this.
Simon
Webb
wondered whether Spain and Italy would be able to contribute. They
were
almost
fully committed in Kosovo, and we were trying to line up Spain as
the next
ISAF
[International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan] lead.
David Manning
however
favoured using the summits for the purpose I suggested. He also
said we
should look
to involve Arab countries: Egypt, Jordan, UAE, and maybe also
Malaysia
and
Pakistan.”
489.
Mr Ehrman
informed Mr Ricketts that Sir David Manning had asked the
MOD:
“… to get
the best information they could, at a senior level, on what size of
sector
was really
being proposed for the UK; and FCO, with MOD, then to let No.10
have
views on
the issues which would be involved in its administration, and how
we would
seek to
deal with these”.
490.
Mr Ehrman
said that the FCO would be setting up a meeting with the MOD
at
official
level the following week.
491.
On 17
February, the IPU sent Mr Ehrman a paper on sectorisation as
part of his
briefing
for a meeting on post-conflict issues chaired by Lieutenant General
Anthony
Pigott,
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments)
(DCDS(C)).210
492.
In the
covering minute, the IPU proposed objectives for the meeting,
including
agreement
on the need for “express international authorisation of any
Coalition
occupation
of Iraq (ie a ‘third’ Security Council resolution)”, and
for:
“… an early
move from a Coalition military occupation to a UN interim
administration:
we need to
make clear to the US that we shall not be prepared to stay at all
long
(60 days?)
under a US/Coalition administration. If there is an early move to
a
209
Minute
Ehrman to Ricketts, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day
After’.
210
Minute Iraq
Planning Unit [junior official] to Ehrman, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
General Pigott’s Meeting:
Sectorisation
and UN Involvement’ attaching Paper [undated and unattributed], ‘A
UK Geographical Sector
of
Iraq?’.
395