The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
including
the port/city of Umm Qasr, the Rumaylah oilfields, the al-Faw
Peninsula, and
the area
around Basra.36
That was to
permit 1 MEF to continue its advance north as
soon as
possible.
56.
1 (UK) Div’s
role was to isolate Basra and, if required, defeat Iraqi forces in
the
vicinity.
The plan did not, however, explicitly require UK forces to enter
Basra. If the
environment
was sufficiently permissive, UK forces would plan to enter Basra
City to
restore or
maintain stability.
57.
In his letter
of 11 March, Mr Watkins informed Sir David that Lt Gen
McKiernan
had
“developed a plan that would expand the UK Area of Operations (UK
AO) by
up to 150km
up to and beyond al-Amara (but short of al-Kut)”. Mr Hoon
judged that
Lt Gen Reith:
“… should
be authorised to expand the Phase III Area of Operations
northwards
if that is
required to achieve a satisfactory outcome to Phase III. The focus
for UK
in Phase IV
should, however, remain the South-Eastern Area of Operations
as
currently
understood.”
58.
The UK AO as
understood at that time included most of Basra province and
small
parts of
Muthanna and Dhi Qar.
59.
Mr Watkins
also identified other scenarios in which the UK land component
could
provide
additional combat power given “delays in the deployment of some US
forces”.
Those
included inserting a light force into central Iraq and armoured
options in support
of the US
“Main Effort” if the UK “could tip the balance”, although that
would “require
US logistic
and medical support” and a “benign” situation in the UK
AO.
60.
Mr Watkins
advised that “to reinforce key gaps in US capability and facilitate
a rapid
US advance”
from the South, the UK could provide:
•
a chemical
and biological warfare detection and decontamination
capability;
•
specialist
engineers; and
•
specialist
bridging capabilities, in case Iraqi forces destroyed the bridge
over
the Euphrates
at Nasiriyah.
61.
Mr Hoon’s
view was that the UK should:
•
confirm the
availability of those specialist capabilities;
•
be “forward
leaning” on extending the AO northwards, “provided that
UK
commanders
judge this sensible in circumstances at the time”; and
•
be prepared
to “continue exploring options for reinforcing US forces at
decisive
points …
but without commitment at this stage”.
36
Minute
Watkins to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military
Plan’.
14