The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
631.
Lt Gen Reith
sent a first version of the SOR for a UK AOR to the Chiefs of
Staff
on 15
April.365
He
explained that:
•
the Chiefs
of Staff had already been asked to agree that “the initial UK
AOR”
should be
“based on” Basra and Maysan provinces;
•
with the
deployment of a divisional headquarters and the “probability
of
additional
Coalition troops”, the UK had the potential to expand the AOR
to
include two
other provinces;
•
the
additional provinces would probably be Dhi Qar and Wasit, but that
had
not been
agreed formally with Lt Gen McKiernan;
•
the UK
“should not plan on substantial early Coalition
augmentation”;
•
the US had
accepted that it should “hold the risk” in areas of potential
UK
responsibility
while waiting for the Coalition force to grow, but there was
no
formal
agreement with the US on the issue; and
•
initial
discussions had begun with some countries, but all “desire to know
where
they will
be asked to operate and the forces required”.
632.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that the UK “should not assume responsibility for more
than
two
provinces until additional and appropriate Coalition Forces are
deployed. This needs
formal
US/UK agreement”.
633.
In the SOR, Lt
Gen Reith set out estimated force requirements for Basra,
Maysan
and the
four other provinces that might be included in an extended UK
AOR:
•
Basra: a
brigade HQ and three battlegroups with appropriate integral
Combat
Support
(CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS);
•
Maysan
(grouped with Basra): a single battlegroup, supported by a
Formation/
Light
Reconnaissance (FR) Company;
•
Wasit: a
brigade HQ and two battlegroups with appropriate CS and
CSS;
•
Dhi Qar: a
brigade HQ and two battlegroups with appropriate CS and
CSS;
•
Diyala: a
brigade HQ and three battlegroups with appropriate CS and
CSS;
•
Muthanna: a
brigade HQ and one battlegroup supported by an FR
Company
with
appropriate CS and CSS.
634.
Lt Gen Reith
explained that the SOR offered “a starting point for discussion
with
potential
troop contributing nations”. It was “early days”:
“…
Coalition Forces do not yet fully control all areas in SE Iraq.
Thus, the SOR may
change and
we will need to remain flexible. Much will depend on detailed
ground
reconnaissance
and the GOC’s intent.”
365
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 15 April 2003, ‘The Statement of Requirement
(SOR) for SE Iraq’.
112