The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
555.
Mr Asquith
had been telling his Sunni contacts that they had to engage in
the
plan and
“not cry foul at the first excuse”. He commented that Prime
Minister Maliki’s
grip had
strengthened and tightened. For the first time he sensed a small
group of
Ministers
working to a common end. However, the risk remained high that,
after the first
two months
of security operations, the underlying political disharmonies and
capability
deficiencies
in delivering improvements in services and economic
reconstruction
would re‑emerge.
556.
On 8 February,
Maj Gen Shaw reported that he had reached a
satisfactory
agreement
with the head of the Basra Provincial Council.288
A
“Comprehensive Plan”
was being
developed by the UK military and civilian staff in Basra aimed at
achieving
a “unifying
approach for all lines of operation” and defining, within the
context of what
was likely
to be achievable, what “stability” and “success” would look
like.
“Achieving
a deal in Basra is the real challenge; it is on this that the FCO
political
plan is to
focus. Social and political power is weak and dispersed. Tribal
influences
are weak:
the displaced Marsh Arabs that occupy the banlieu are
rootless,
disenfranchised
and guns for hire. Political power is divided and unrepresentative
…
It is not
clear that either social or political power is sufficiently
coherently organised
for deals
to be made. The only unifying themes would appear to be fear of the
abyss
were MNF to
leave, fear of malign Iranian influence and greed … The hope is
that
a Basrawi
majority in favour of a deal will emerge, with our military role
being to
neutralise
the irreconcilables … Identifying where this split occurs, eg
within JAM,
will be key
… I have no sense that the precursor talks to any deal have yet
begun
between the
potential parties; making a prediction as to when such a deal
might
be
forthcoming and what form it might take becomes another key …
requirement.
All of
which emphasises the essentially political nature of the end state
to which all
on the SISG
[Southern Iraq Steering Group] must work, and the importance of
the
aforementioned
political plan.”
558.
Dr Marsden
reported on 9 February that she considered that the UK’s plans
to
re‑posture
within Basra were “an opportunity to change the political dynamics
in Basra
more in our
favour and achieve greater political engagement in the run up to
PIC,
thereby
reducing the chances of further boycotts”.289
559.
Dr Marsden
considered that local Basrawi politicians did not believe that
the
UK was
serious about early transition to PIC and used this “as an excuse
not to
288
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 8 February 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 8
February 2007’.
289
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 9 February 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
104