3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
•
the MEPP
had to be taken forward and efforts were continuing to hold
a
conference
with the Palestinians on reform in London the following
week.
470.
Mr Hoon
reported his visit to Turkey and the sensitivities about
actions
involving Iraq.
471.
Commenting on
the preparations for the deployment of military forces to
the
Gulf,
Mr Hoon told his colleagues that no decisions had been taken
to launch military
action. Nor
had the US finalised its military planning. Some changes to forces
assigned
to
Operation FRESCO, to provide an emergency fire fighting capability
during the
firefighters’
strike, would be necessary to keep options open.
472.
Mr Blair
concluded that the future behaviour of Saddam Hussein in
responding
to UN
pressure was “unpredictable”. The UK was “right to continue with
its military
preparations”.
It should also maintain the focus on the fight with international
terrorism
and
preventive measures at home. Media reports of a rift within the
Cabinet were
“nonsense”.
Cabinet the following week would “provide the opportunity for an
in‑depth
discussion
of Iraq”.
473.
In the press
briefing after Cabinet, the Prime Minister’s Official
Spokesman
said that
Mr Blair had “underlined his view that the weapons inspectors
in Iraq had
to be given
the time and space to do their job properly”, and that “while 27
January
was an
important staging point in the process, it should not be regarded
in any way
474.
The Spokesman
also said dismissed press reports that Mr Blair had
authorised
an attack
on one Secretary of State by another.
475.
In his
diaries, Mr Campbell wrote that there had been a discussion
about
comments by
Cabinet Ministers and the need to avoid giving personal
opinions.161
Ms Short
had accused Mr Hoon and the MOD of briefing against
Mr Straw. She had also
asked for a
discussion of the military options because she did not believe that
UK forces
were
needed.
476.
In his memoir,
Mr Robin Cook, Leader of the House of Commons, June 2001
to
March 2003,
wrote that three newspapers that morning had carried a story
demanding
Mr Straw’s
resignation, and a claim that Mr Blair had authorised attacks
by Mr Hoon.162
Mr Cook
did not believe the story. He wrote that in Cabinet Ms Short
had deplored the
attacks and
he had said that Mr Straw was “doing a great job in keeping
the Iraq crisis
in the
UN track”.
160
The
National Archives, 9 January 2003, Thursday 9
January morning government press briefing.
161
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
162
Cook
R. The Point
of Departure. Simon
& Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.
85