8 | The
invasion
207.
In relation to
a subsequent presentation and discussion on the military campaign
in
the MOD,
with the Chiefs of Staff and Lt Gen Reith, Mr Campbell
added:
“… it was
absolutely clear that this was going to be a lot tougher. Reith
felt the US
had been
excessively optimistic about the collapse of the regime. The hard
core and
Fedayeen
were absolutely up for it. TB asked about Baghdad. They said it
would be
split into
forty sectors … It would take several weeks, and there were lots of
dangers
… at Basra
… it was not yet clear the best way to proceed.
“The most
important thing for TB was to communicate to the Iraqis that we
should
see this
through, that they would benefit from the fall of Saddam. But we
should not
expect them
to welcome with open arms, because they will find it hard to
believe the
Saddam era
is ending. We were doing OK with public opinion in our own
country,
but we were
nowhere in Iraq. Reith said we had to separate regime from
people,
and that
meant taking out his media … Back at Number 10, TB was clear that
it
was going
to take longer than anticipated. Shock and awe had not really
happened.
So we
had taken the political hit of a stupid piece of terminology, and
then not
actually
had the military benefits.”
208.
The COBR daily
report on 25 March related “some concern about the
humanitarian
situation
in Basra where water and electricity supplies have been disrupted
since Friday
209.
The draft
operational concept for Phase IV operations submitted to the Chiefs
of
Staff by Lt
Gen Reith on 25 March is considered later in this
Section.
210.
On the evening
of 25 March, the MOD reported that:
•
“Elements
of UK land force continue to test city/town fighting in az-Zubayr
as
a precursor
to decision on tactics with Basra …”;
•
the tactics
for the next 12 hours would be to: “Isolate the Iraqi irregular
forces
from the
civilian population in Basra”;
•
poor
weather was having a significant effect on the campaign: helicopter
flights
in Southern
Iraq had been suspended again because of bad weather,
hampering
freedom of
movement for Coalition Forces;
•
16 Air
Assault Brigade remained in Rumaylah, and 3 Commando Brigade on
the
al-Faw
Peninsula;
•
the 1st
Battalion The Parachute Regiment, an element of 16 Air Assault
Brigade,
remained on
standby for a planned operation to secure Qalat Sikar Air
Base
(an Iraqi
Air Force base in Maysan province) for use in the Coalition
logistics
chain; to
observe any advance of Iraqi forces from the east; and to
provide
a screen
to advancing US forces, postponed due to bad weather;
and
135
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
COBR Round Up of
Key Events –
25 March’.
37