The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
on other
parts of Iraq, where tensions between the Badr-dominated ISF and
JAM had
created a
“more permissive environment”.
515.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that work to determine the future UK force
structure
requirements
for MND(SE) beyond March 2008 was being conducted, using a figure
of
3,000
personnel as the planning baseline. It would be important to bear
in mind the size
and nature
of the UK’s commitment in Baghdad, particularly the senior officers
based
there, as
part of that work.
516.
Government
officials working closely with the military met JAM1 on 16
October.246
During the
meeting, the compound was hit by indirect fire, which JAM1
described as “the
work of
wreckers”. The officials said that the attack and JAM1’s reaction
to it had helped
them to get
the point across to MND(SE) that not all indirect fire was a
contravention of
the
agreement reached.
517.
The officials
raised the prospect of political engagement, explaining that the
UK
was working
with all the Basra parties to achieve political rapprochement and
prepare for
next year’s
elections – except the Sadrists: “It was difficult for us to defend
the Sadrists’
rightful
place at the political table if they declined to work with other
political entities to
prepare the
meal.” JAM1 explained that Muqtada al-Sadr was clear that foreign
troops
were
“occupiers” and should not be dealt with:
“But this
straight bat stuff out of the way, a more nuanced and positive
picture
emerged:
there might actually be two OMS-affiliated parties standing, one of
which
was ‘pure’
OMS and the other more prepared to broker with minor parties. And
OMS
was
preparing … a group of leaders in Basra who would deal with other
parties and,
under the
table, with MNF…”
“Furthermore,
an interlocutor … would be coming down to Basra from
Baghdad …
and would
visit [JAM1] in the DIF [Divisional Internment Facility]. This was
a senior
man, not of
the OMS but a Sadrist, who would be seeking to broker a much
wider
deal which
would embrace all the Sadrists on one side and all of MNF on
the
other …
To that end [JAM1] had already sent us a list of ten Basrawis in
American
custody
whose release would endorse British credentials as the potential
deal-
makers for
all of Iraq … JAM1 noted that Basrawis still feared that the
Americans
would,
sooner or later, occupy Basra. This would be a disaster, the end of
all things.
But
Sadrists now recognised that the Americans were not beyond
negotiation and
believed
that we offered the most trustworthy point of
contact.”
246
Email
government official working closely with the military, 16 October
2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:
Meeting
with [JAM1] 16 October and MND(SE) [NAME OF OPERATION]
Discussions’.
278