The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
887.
The Inquiry
was given a range of views about the UK’s policy
objectives
for
resolution 1441, the relative priority of those objectives, and
what had
been achieved.
888.
Some
witnesses emphasised the objective of disarming Iraq through
a
policy of
coercive diplomacy and agreement on an effective inspections
regime
without
military action.
889.
Other
witnesses emphasised the purpose of providing a legal base
for
military
action without the need for a further decision by the Security
Council.
890.
Resolution
1441 decided (OP1) that Iraq “has been and remains in
material
breach” of
its obligations under relevant resolutions adopted by the Security
Council,
in
particular its failure to co‑operate with UNMOVIC and the IAEA and
to complete the
actions for
disarmament required by resolution 687 (1991), and decided to set
up an
enhanced
inspection regime.
891.
In his advice
of 7 March 2003, Lord Goldsmith wrote that:
“… while
the US objective was to ensure the resolution did not constrain the
right of
action
which they believed they already had, our objective was to secure a
sufficient
authorisation
from the Council in the absence of which we would have had no
right
892.
Lord
Goldsmith’s consideration of the legal effect of the resolution and
whether
it achieved
that objective is addressed in Section 5.
893.
Mr Blair
was asked to provide a statement setting out:
•
his
understanding of President Bush’s objectives in relation to the
UN;
•
his
objectives and strategy in the negotiation of [resolution]
1441;
•
whether he
was aware of differences between the UK’s position and
prevailing
American
objectives for 1441; and
•
the
implications of those differences for his strategy.300
894.
In response,
Mr Blair wrote:
“The
objectives for both President Bush and myself in trying to secure a
fresh
resolution
were clear: to give Saddam one final chance to comply; and to make
it
clear if he
didn’t, then we would act, if necessary by force. In other words:
change
of heart or
change of regime. Because he had so frequently broken his
word,
disregarded
UN resolutions and refused to comply with the inspectors, we
knew
299
Minute
Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution
1441’.
300
Inquiry
request for a written statement, 13 December 2010, Q4, page
2.
358