The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1526.
The FCO
briefed Dr Howells on concerns about over‑recruiting Iraqi
police. In
Muthanna,
there was estimated to be three times as many officers as the
sanctioned
1,960. In
Maysan, staffing levels were twice the 4,000 agreed by MNF‑I. Those
units
sat “almost
entirely outside” existing training programmes for the
IPS.
1527.
On 24 August,
the UK military vacated Camp Abu Naji on the outskirts
of
al‑Amara in
Maysan and handed it over to the Iraqi Army.1394
Shortly
afterwards the base
was looted,
with reports that the Iraqi Army at best allowed the looting but
may have
been
directly involved.
1528.
On 26 October,
Maj Gen Shirreff reported that there was significant
fighting in
al‑Amara:
“Al‑Amara
and the fighting between JAM and the IPS, has dominated events
this
week.
Nevertheless, despite the media images of burning buildings,
destroyed police
vehicles
and black‑clad militiamen with slung RPGs [Rocket Propelled
Grenades],
the news is
not all bad. Events were kicked off with the killing of the (Badr)
Head of
the
Criminal Intelligence Unit by JAM, resulting in the arrest (and
subsequent killing)
of the
brother of the leader of Amara JAM by the IPS. In response JAM
attacked the
Badr
dominated IPS. In the ensuing street battles on 19‑20 Oct around 20
people
were
killed, scores injured, dozens of police cars destroyed and several
buildings
damaged.
Despite all this, the response by both the IA and the Iraqi
Government
gives
ground for optimism.”1395
1529.
Maj Gen Shirreff
reported that the 10th Division had responded by deploying
large
numbers of
troops rapidly and the Government had sent a delegation from
Baghdad to
negotiate a
cease-fire. MNF assets had been used to show force and provide
situational
awareness.
Maj Gen Shirreff reported that the incident had
“tempered” assessments of
Maysan’s
readiness for security transition.
1530.
The cease-fire
held into the following week but there were reports of police
being
murdered in
their homes.1396
1531.
On 8 December
2006, a junior FCO official emailed Mr Asquith to say that
the
MND(SE)
Strategy Group had agreed Maysan should be reinstated as a
candidate for
transition
in January 2007.1397
Mr Asquith
was asked to encourage Dr Rubaie to “press
hard” for
this at MCNS.
1532.
On 10
December, Mr Asquith responded:
“MND(SE)
have just assessed Maysan as Amber (so even the most
ardent
transitioners
aren’t pushing); the Chief of Police is refusing to step
down;
1394
Minute
Shirreff, 31 August 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 31
August 2006’.
1395
Minute
Shirreff, 26 October 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 26
October 2006’.
1396
Minute
Everard, 2 November 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 2
November 2006’.
1397
Email FCO
[junior official] to Asquith, 8 December 2006, ‘IPU
Priorities’.
406