The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
find the
stuff, that we were right all along about the Iraqi WMD threat
(questionable –
what
convinces the experts may not convince public opinion unless it is
pretty
spectacular);
and a smooth transfer to a democratic and stable
government
(improbable,
especially without UN cover) would reduce the damage. But
this
is a high
risk route.
“Before we
go down this route, we should have a last look at
alternatives,
as Jeremy Greenstock
is urging.”128
475.
Mr Chaplin
suggested that the UK should consider a deal with France,
Germany
and Russia,
insisting on full Iraqi compliance with a short list of key
disarmament
tasks,
backed by the maximum number of inspectors and increased air
surveillance,
with a
short deadline (15 March). There should be a signal in advance
that, short of
full
compliance, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5)
would vote
for an “all
necessary means” text. This would come into force 10 days after the
passage
of a
Security Council resolution to give time for the Arabs to persuade
Saddam Hussein
to stand
down. The “goal would be one more last chance for Saddam
Hussein”.
476.
Mr Chaplin
and Mr Ricketts had agreed that the latter would discuss the
idea with
Mr Straw
on their way to New York on 14 February.
477.
Mr Pattison
suggested two options to attract support from the
“middle ground
members”:
•
encouraging
Dr Blix to set specific tasks to demonstrate Iraqi
compliance,
building on
his own ideas; or
•
the
Security Council to set specific tasks for Iraq with a
deadline.129
478.
There would be
difficulties with both approaches. The problem with the first
option
would lie
in “getting the US to accept further delay and the likelihood that
Iraq would do
just enough
to provoke future wrangling over the extent of their compliance”.
In addition,
the US
might be hesitant about giving Dr Blix a greater role. The
problem with the
second
option was that it “would create an expectation that the UNSC would
need
to take
a further decision to authorise serious consequences and we would
expect Iraq
to do just
enough to split the Council”.
479.
Mr Ricketts
advised Mr Straw:
“Each
variant had pros and cons. The main difficulty could well be to
bring the
Americans
to accept any specific ultimatum given the scope it would leave for
Iraq
to gain
more time through minor concessions.”130
128
Minute
Chaplin to Ricketts, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: The
Endgame’.
129
Minute
Pattison to Ricketts, 15 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Options for UNSC
Action’.
130
Minute
Ricketts to Secretary of State [FCO], 15 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Rethinking Strategy’.
266