The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
214.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Blair: “US has been very slow to get
the Iraq
Survey
Group up + running – one reason for the PR difficulties – along
with Rumsfeld.”114
215.
The ISG was
launched on 30 May.115
216.
On 4 June,
officials advised that the ISG was expected to achieve an
initial
operating
capability about 10 days later.116
217.
Under an
arrangement negotiated between the DoD and the CIA, the ISG
was
initially
placed under US military command.
218.
The UK planned
to provide 100-120 personnel, including some former
UNSCOM
219.
In a
background note for Mr Blair on the difference between the ISG
and XTF-75,
Mr Nicholas
Cannon, Mr Blair’s Assistant Private Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, described
XTF-75 as
“a slightly mechanical exercise, carried out by the military, and
based on a
fixed body
of information”.118
The ISG was
intended to be “a more flexible, intelligence-
driven
organisation”, which would generate its own intelligence, including
through
interrogations,
and have its own analysis capacity. The ISG would include
former
UNMOVIC
inspectors, would target individuals as well as sites, and would
have
1,300-1,400
personnel compared with 750-800 in XTF-75.
220.
General Sir
Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff, issued an addition
to
the 18 March
Execute Directive for Op TELIC on 18 June. The Directive
instructed
Lt Gen
Reith to provide air transport for the movement of small teams of
ISG personnel
between
Iraq and Qatar as “a high priority”.119
The
arrangement was to be kept under
monthly
review.
221.
A revised
Directive incorporating additional guidance, issued on
30 July, is
described
in the Box ‘Revised Directive on UK military co-operation with the
ISG’ later
in this
Section.
222.
The ISG became
“fully operational” in early August.120
114
Manuscript
comment Manning to Prime Minister, 29 May 2003, on letter
Watkins to Manning,
27 May
2003, ‘Iraq WMD: Update’.
115
Letter
McDonald to Rycroft, 2 June 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: Third Party
Validation’.
116
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 4 June 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD Detection and
Elimination: Public Handling’.
117
Letter
McDonald to Rycroft, 2 June 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: Third Party
Validation’.
118
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Iraq Survey
Group and 75th Exploitation
Task
Force’.
119
Paper MOD,
18 June 2003, ‘Chief of the Defence Staff Execute Directive to
the Joint Commander
Operation
TELIC Edition 2 Frago 02’.
120
Minute
Scarlett to Cannon, 8 August 2003, ‘Iraq WMD’.
468