6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
334.
A JIC
Assessment on 4 July addressed regime cohesion in Iraq and
how
it would
respond under pressure or attack.
335.
Although it
had only fragmentary intelligence about how the regime
would
deal with
an attack including ground forces, the JIC assessed on 4 July that
only
massive
military force would be guaranteed to topple Saddam
Hussein
336.
The JIC
judged that disintegration of the regime would be most likely if
Iraqi
ground
forces were being comprehensively defeated; if top military
officers could
be
persuaded that their fate was not irrevocably tied to that of
Saddam Hussein;
or if
Saddam were to be killed.
337.
At the request
of the MOD, the JIC issued an Assessment of “how cohesion of
the
Iraqi
regime is maintained and how the regime would fare under pressure
or attack” on
338.
The minutes of
the JIC discussion of the draft paper described it as:
“… an
important paper with a specific focus. It would be of interest to
Ministers more
because of
its context, with decisions yet to be taken about what to do with
Iraq,
than
because of its analysis, which was familiar rather than
novel.
“Its key
message was that although Saddam Hussein’s regime was
remarkably
resilient
to pressure … the demonstration of a real and overwhelming
international
determination
and ability to remove the regime through military force was the
likeliest
way to
bring it down …
“Experience
in Afghanistan had shown that generating expectations and
influencing
people’s
perceptions of what might happen had considerable capacity to
effect real
and rapid
change …
“The paper
needed to analyse and describe in more detail the nature of
Saddam’s
support …
The motives for each set of supporters were different … These
mattered
because
under pressure the different groups would behave
differently.
“UK policy
makers, and military planners, would be keen before too long to
identify
the point
at which self‑interested loyalty for Saddam might turn into
disillusionment,
fragility
and fragmentation.”160
159
JIC
Assessment, 4 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion’.
160
Minutes, 3
July 2002, JIC meeting.
225