6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
145.
Sir David
Manning added in a manuscript comment: “… further request
from
Geoff Hoon
that you should persuade Bush to include us in the US military
planning
146.
In a separate
minute to Mr Blair, Sir David wrote:
“We need to
start US/UK military planning (ie access for UK military planners
in
Washington
and CENTCOM – the point CDS [Adm Boyce] made at
Chequers).”77
147.
Mr Blair
met President Bush at Crawford, Texas, on 5 and 6 April. The
discussion
and
Mr Blair’s subsequent statements – in a press conference with
President Bush,
the speech
at College Station on 7 April, in Parliament on 10 April, and to
Cabinet on
11 April
– are addressed in Section 3.2.
148.
A three‑page
record of the discussions on Iraq was circulated on a
secret
and
strictly personal basis by Sir David Manning in a letter to
Mr Simon McDonald,
Mr Straw’s
Principal Private Secretary, which was sent only to
Mr Watkins
(for Mr Hoon),
Admiral Boyce, Sir Michael Jay (FCO Permanent Under
Secretary),
Sir Richard Dearlove,
Sir Christopher Meyer (British Ambassador to the US)
and
149.
In relation to
military action, Sir David Manning recorded that the meeting
on
Saturday
morning was informed that:
•
There was
no war plan for Iraq.
•
Thinking so
far had been on a broad, conceptual level.
•
A very
small cell in Central Command in Florida had recently been set up
to
do some
planning and to think through the various options.
•
When the US
had done that, US and UK planners would be able to sit
down
together to
examine the options.
•
The US and
UK would work through the issues together.
150.
Sir David
recorded that Mr Blair and President Bush had
discussed:
•
the need to
enhance not diminish regional stability;
•
who might
replace Saddam Hussein if action was taken to topple
him;
•
the impact
of a moderate, secular regime in Iraq on other countries in the
region;
•
the need to
manage public relations with great care;
•
putting
Saddam Hussein on the spot over UN inspections and seeking
proof
of the
claim that he was not developing WMD; and
76
Manuscript
comment Manning on Letter Watkins to Manning, 4 April 2002,
‘Iraq’.
77
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 4 April 2002, ‘Crawford
Checklist’.
78
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 8 April 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to the
United States: 5‑7 April’.
199