The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
719.
A senior
government official specialising in the Middle East (2) wrote
to
Dr John Jenkins,
FCO Director Middle East and North Africa, on 21 December to
take
stock
following JAM1’s release and to offer views on next steps for JAM
and Shia
engagement.341
He wrote
that “The key task for HMG is to preserve the relative
peace
in Basra”
in order to protect what had been achieved already and “to try to
bring the
Sadrist
movement nationally to the kind of strategic tipping point achieved
with the
Sunnis in
Anbar”. The objective was a “fractured, but not atomised, JAM”. He
wrote that
Shia
engagement would remain a “strategic priority in Iraq” with the aim
of deepening
dialogue
with a range of Sadrist interlocutors. But only the US would have
the “breadth
and depth”
for Shia engagement across Iraq, so the challenge was “to support
and
influence
this effort not to go it alone”.
720.
Mr Browne
wrote to Mr Brown on 22 December with an update on force
levels
from spring
2008, reflecting “further work” since Mr Brown’s statement to
Parliament
721.
Mr Browne
wrote that the latest military advice, endorsed by the Chiefs
of
Staff and
incorporating direction from Gen Petraeus, was that the UK should
deploy
2,750 personnel
in southern Iraq, supported by 800 in Kuwait. That was 550 higher
than
Mr Brown
had announced on 8 October. The reason for the increase was a
decision by
the Czech
government to withdraw its Basra contingent in 2008 and the need to
have a
slightly
larger headquarters to provide for effective understanding of the
situation on the
ground and
to ensure effective engagement with key Iraqi leaders.
“… I
believe we can present these figures as broadly consistent with the
aspirations
you
outlined to Parliament in October, and further that we can make a
positive
case for a
small potential increase in our planning figures, as a
demonstration of
how
decisions on force levels will be guided by advice from military
commanders
and an
assessment of conditions on the ground – a point you and I have
always
emphasised.”
723.
On 24
December, Lt Gen Rollo reported a “startling sequel” to the
handover
ceremony in
Basra.343
Gen Mohan
and Governor Waili held a press conference
alongside
an OMS delegation from Najaf, live on Al Iraqiya television. The
OMS
spokesman
had welcomed PIC and supported the Iraqi security
organisations.
Lt Gen Rollo
observed that this was “All very welcome – both for Basra and for
handling
US
perceptions of the situation in the South.”
341
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2) to
Jenkins, 21 December 2007,
‘Shia
engagement: [NAME OF OPERATION] after [JAM1]’s
release’.
342
Letter
Browne to Brown, 22 December 2007, ‘Iraq: Proposed Force Levels
from Spring 2008’.
343
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 24 December 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (282) 23
Dec 07’.
314