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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
been recorded and filed by my Private Office. That is precisely what happened in
respect of a private note I did ask Sir Kevin for in respect of the risks to our wider
relationship with the US of not being involved on the ground in Iraq [Sir Kevin’s
minute of 14 January 2003] … If it was important to have such a discussion amongst
Cabinet colleagues, I would have expected to receive formal advice to that effect.”
271.  There is no dispute about the fact that Mr Hoon and Sir Kevin Tebbit
discussed the potential impact on US/UK relations if the UK were to be unable
to act alongside the US if military action was taken; and that Sir Kevin was asked
to produce private advice for Mr Hoon.
272.  Sir Kevin Tebbit’s advice of 14 January covered only potential damage to the
US/ UK strategic relationship because that was what Mr Hoon had asked him to do.
273.  The evidence from Mr Hoon and Sir Kevin is clear on that point.
274.  The Inquiry cannot, however, resolve the differing accounts provided by
Sir Kevin Tebbit and Mr Hoon about the circumstances of that request; and
whether Sir Kevin had advised Mr Hoon that Ministers should pause and take
the opportunity for a full discussion of the UK’s options.
275.  The Inquiry accepts the evidence that Sir Kevin prepared a note over
Christmas 2002 as he told the Inquiry; and that Mr Hoon did not receive it.
276.  Given the nature of the advice, and the importance of the issues it addressed, the
Inquiry would have expected a document of the nature described by Sir Kevin Tebbit to
have been preserved in both his Private Office and Mr Hoon’s, notwithstanding the fact
that it was handwritten.
277.  No handwritten note from Sir Kevin Tebbit to Mr Hoon was included amongst the
papers first disclosed to the Inquiry by the MOD.
278.  Although the Inquiry specifically asked the MOD to search for such a document,
including contacting Mr Hoon’s and Sir Kevin’s Private Secretaries at the time, it has not
been found.
279.  Sir Kevin Tebbit clearly had concerns in early 2003 about the implications of
a switch in the UK military focus from the North to the South of Iraq.
280.  At the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 6 January 2003 he had noted that the option
being discussed was significantly different from that on which Ministers had been
consulted.99
281.  Sir Kevin’s recollection of the document he had written is detailed. The Inquiry has
no reason to question his evidence.
99  Minute Johnston to Private Secretary [FCO], 6 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 6 January’.
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