The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
been
recorded and filed by my Private Office. That is precisely what
happened in
respect of
a private note I did ask Sir Kevin for in respect of the risks to
our wider
relationship
with the US of not being involved on the ground in Iraq [Sir
Kevin’s
minute of
14 January 2003] … If it was important to have such a discussion
amongst
Cabinet
colleagues, I would have expected to receive formal advice to that
effect.”
271.
There is no
dispute about the fact that Mr Hoon and Sir Kevin
Tebbit
discussed
the potential impact on US/UK relations if the UK were to be
unable
to act
alongside the US if military action was taken; and that Sir Kevin
was asked
to produce
private advice for Mr Hoon.
272.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit’s advice of 14 January covered only potential damage to
the
US/ UK
strategic relationship because that was what Mr Hoon had asked him
to do.
273.
The evidence
from Mr Hoon and Sir Kevin is clear on that point.
274.
The Inquiry
cannot, however, resolve the differing accounts provided
by
Sir Kevin
Tebbit and Mr Hoon about the circumstances of that request;
and
whether Sir
Kevin had advised Mr Hoon that Ministers should pause and
take
the
opportunity for a full discussion of the UK’s options.
275.
The Inquiry
accepts the evidence that Sir Kevin prepared a note
over
Christmas
2002 as he told the Inquiry; and that Mr Hoon did not receive
it.
276.
Given the
nature of the advice, and the importance of the issues it
addressed, the
Inquiry
would have expected a document of the nature described by Sir Kevin
Tebbit to
have been
preserved in both his Private Office and Mr Hoon’s, notwithstanding
the fact
that it was
handwritten.
277.
No handwritten
note from Sir Kevin Tebbit to Mr Hoon was included amongst
the
papers
first disclosed to the Inquiry by the MOD.
278.
Although the
Inquiry specifically asked the MOD to search for such a
document,
including
contacting Mr Hoon’s and Sir Kevin’s Private Secretaries at the
time, it has not
been
found.
279.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit clearly had concerns in early 2003 about the implications
of
a switch in
the UK military focus from the North to the South of
Iraq.
280.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 6 January 2003 he had noted that the
option
being
discussed was significantly different from that on which Ministers
had been
281.
Sir Kevin’s
recollection of the document he had written is detailed. The
Inquiry has
no reason
to question his evidence.
99
Minute
Johnston to Private Secretary [FCO], 6 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs
of Staff Meeting, 6 January’.
426